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Introduction
Thesis Proposal
1. Introduction
In the past decade, the world has seen a shift in the determining factor for
power and authority. Religion and land have been influential factors deciding who or
who does not have power across continents, time, and civilizations. In the 21st
century, these two sources of influence have lost their supremacy in determining a
nation’s power or authority. Power and authority are now defined by a nation’s access
to and influence over resources. Resources define the position of a nation in terms of
its economy, society, and political structure and influence. The Middle East exists as
a perfect microcosm for studying the complex relationship of resources with the
dichotomy of power, seen in the conflict over oil and water. The region’s resource
conflicts are often emphasized due to its extreme amount of and geopolitical status of
resources. Oil is found in large quantities in the Persian Gulf, specifically in Saudi
Arabia, while water is found in relatively scarce quantities in the region, specifically
in Palestine.
To mask the competition for oil and water in the Middle East, civilizations
and religion are often blamed for having a substantial role in the atmosphere of the
conflict-ridden region. The common conception of the clash between the US and the
Muslim world is portrayed as the source of conflicts. Through the theory of the “clash
of civilizations” by Samuel Huntington, tensions arise because of differences in
religious views, correlated with disagreements in practices, moral beliefs, and
lifestyles. In the Middle East, Islamic fundamentalism (a Muslim minority) becomes
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the face of modern resistance to the US. The Islamic response of resistance to the
modernizing world should not be attributed to differing civilizations and religions, but
to the opposition of structural pressures experienced in the Muslim world and
encouraged by the “rationalized,” “Western” world. The grievance of Islamic
fundamentalists who ask for a revival of society are reacting against the influence of
Western colonialism, seen through the influence and effect of resources, like oil and
water, that support the institution of structure pressures of one nation onto another.
The world’s dependence on oil has exponentially grown due to the evolution
of technology that needs a constant influx of energy to sustain its activities. The
world’s oil dependence began in 1859 when the United States developed the first
large-scale petroleum industry, which maintained the US’ economic growth through
the 20th century. The Standard Oil Company, Aramco, and Atlantic Richfield were
established as the first large multinational corporations to capitalize on the discovery
of the profitable resource of oil.1 Before World War II, the United States was one of
the few nations that possessed oil, which helped to build the US’ economy
domestically and internationally.2 Looking at the US’ success, other nations began to
invest in the oil industry for the development and protection of their nation,
increasing the international demand for oil dramatically. At the same time, due to the
discovery and development of the oil industry, the Middle East became an important
region for the US due to the emerging oil reserves that would be vital to the US’
future national security.

1
2

Michael Klare. Blood and Oil (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 8
Ibid. 9
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Saudi Arabia was one of the first nations in the Middle East to be drastically
affected by US influence. Rich in oil reserves, the kingdom was one of the first
nations in the Gulf to have the US military stationed within its borders to ensure the
free flow of oil. An alliance between the US and Saudi Arabia was initiated to ensure
the safety of the kingdom’s oil reserves, while generating at the same time an
emerging radical Islamic response to the structural pressures exerted by the US. The
development of this resource and its ensuing influence in the Middle East has kept the
world in a constant battle over the power, availability, and protection of oil ever
since.
The conflict over water in Palestine lies at both the Israelis and Palestinians’
desire for an independent nation. Water is a fundamental source of life and is
essential for structuring, developing, and modernizing a state, the goal for both the
Israelis and Palestinians. The harsh, desert climate of Palestine posses numerous
problems concerning the conflict over water since both identities share the similar
environmental obstacle. The severe climate produces difficult and complex conditions
for water usage as well as the sustainability of human water supplies and ecosystems.
In the Middle East, each region’s ecosystem must find a way to sustain its needs for
the populations, whether through terrestrial or aquatic water sources. Presently, Israel
has control of the majority of water sources in Palestine, while the Palestinians are
given substantially fewer rights to water sources. These sources include the Mountain
Aquifer and the Jordan River, which are equally needed by both groups for their
population’s basic human needs. The West Bank proves to be the center region for
water rights of the Jordan River that are predominantly controlled by Israel, putting
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Palestine in the subservient position. The position of Israel’s control over water rights
and sources in Palestine is due to certain structural pressures that elevate the
complexity of the conflict. Water is the determining factor of power and rests at the
heart of the conflict in Palestine.
The two resources, oil and water, fuel the world as it modernizes and
globalizes. The struggle over resources underscores the conflict that occurs in
response to Western influence in the Middle East and the numerous individuals upset
by its current economic and political order.

2. Subject of Thesis
While the introduction lays out the general idea of the struggle over resources,
the deeper subtext discusses the origins for the US’ drive to maintain control over
resources in the Middle East and the reactions to the Western-style society from the
Muslim world. The US holds the dominant force in the world for numerous reasons,
which nations often attempt to imitate due to its political and economic success. Its
dominant role is attributed to two reasons: first, to the need for resource security to
maintain its high-consumption rate and second, the maintenance of the US dollar’s
position in the international oil market. A different economic strategy results from the
US’ international force driven by the US’ neoconservative movement for “Pax
Americana,” or total American domination. The US’ hidden agendas for resource
domination are hidden by the way the Muslim world is portrayed seen similarly to the
depictions of Soviets during the Cold War.
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Thus when the Muslim world responds to the industrialized world of
modernization and globalization, Islamic fundamentalism (or political Islam) is
fatally misunderstood in its attempt to respond to the modern, rationalized world of
the US interests in the Middle East. A small Muslim minority of Islamic
fundamentalists became the face of Islam, obscuring and misinterpreting Islam’s
entire message at the price of starting a ‘cosmic war.’ The response calls for a
reemergence of Islam in societies seen as too modern or too “Western,” and Islam
existing as the savior for the world’s problems of corruption, materialism, and
immorality. The 18th century leader of the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia, alWahhab, and the 20th century Egyptian radical thinker, Sayyid Qutb, both played
influential roles in Islamic fundamentalism in the 21st century. Both articulate the
struggle against invading forces framed by their own experiences with foreign
powers, which hinder the proselytization of Islam. However, the reality lies in the fact
that conflict results from the hatred of certain radical Islamic fundamentalists towards
the modernization of their world as a result of structural powers applied to societies
seen with oil and water.
The conflicts over resources stress the noteworthy concern over the effect of
Western structural pressures in Muslim societies. The concern of Islamic
fundamentalists over the US’ international influence represents a clash of human
interests rather than a clash of civilizations or religions. Illuminating the US’
excessive consumption and exploitation of the world’s resources, the US’ hidden
structural pressures are demystified as a tangible force as the protection of resources.3

3

David Orr. “Millennial Hope: Climate Change and Far Horizon for Possibility.” 2008 Hart Institute
Lecture Series, Pomona College, Claremont, California
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Organization
Chapter 1 is a discussion of the theoretical position of religion in modern
society using the two hypotheses, Max Weber’s “secularization theory” and Samuel
Huntington’s “clash of civilizations.” The secularization theory states that the modern
world in the 20th century has experienced a decline of religion in society, religious
beliefs, practices, and institutions. The chapter begins with criticisms of the theory
that it is a valid premise for argument, seen in the articles, “Toward Desacrilizing
Secularization Theory,” by Jeffrey K. Hadden, and, “The Case Against Secularization
Theory: A Rebuttal,” by Frank J. Lechner4. A discussion follows of the varying
opinions regarding the secularization theory and whether or not it is correct. Peter
Berger and Mark Chaves support secularization theory, while David Brooks and
Rodney Stark refute the argument and believe religion is thriving.
The “clash of civilizations” presents the hypothesis that our world’s conflicts
are over differing civilizations, cultures, and religions. Huntington’s argument is
explained and elaborated on, followed by a criticism and rejection of the legitimacy
of the argument. Edward Said’s article titled, “The Clash of Definitions,”5 and Roy P.
Mottahedeh’s article titled, “The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique,”6
are used to negate the “clash of civilizations” hypothesis. The chapter ends with a
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Jeffrey K. Hadden. “Toward Desacralizing Secularization Theory,” Social Forces, Vol. 65, No. 3
(Mar., 1987), Frank J. Lechner. “The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal.” Social Forces, Vol. 69,
No. 4 (Jun., 1991)
5
Edward W. Said, “The Clash of Definitions,” in The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Entity,
ed. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003)
6
Roy P. Mottahedeh, “The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique,” in The New Crusades:
Constructing the Muslim Entity, ed. Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2003), 133.
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discussion of the sacred and how it has changed during the modern age. Max L.
Stackhouse’s article, “The Location of the Holy,”7 is used to discuss this argument
that the sacred and the holy are seen differently that its past uses in society.
In order introduce Islamic fundamentalism, I used Roxanne L. Euben’s book
Enemy in the Mirror to discuss its relationship with the “rationalized” society that
influences the movement’s very existence, purpose, and actions, however creating a
culturally constructed discourse. The “rationalism” denotes a “progress of reason”
from 19th century theories of rationalization, linked first to the advance of Western
culture that results in a modernized narrative. 8 Rationalized societies create the
phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism as a functional, epiphenomenal paradox by
assuming its reactions are solely politically or socio-economically motivated, which
further reinforces the neglect of the fundamentalist view as being valid and justified.
Likewise, the vital characteristics of the movement’s religious faith and inspiration
are disregarded, and become “functionalized” to the point that its true meaning is
misconstrued into an “irrational,” distorted meaning. The resistance of Islamic
fundamentalism to the struggle against Western structural pressures uses a cultural
and political context to mobilize their protest against modernization through the claim
of religious reform.
The purpose of the chapter is to expose the reality of the place of religion and
Islamic fundamentalism in the context of conflict. Natural resources, intertwined with
political mobilization, are the tangible influences acting upon the Middle East that
Islamic fundamentalism resists to in the name of religious revival. Oil and water stand
7

Max L. Stackhouse. “The Location of the Holy.” The Journal of Religious Ethics. Vol. 4, No. 1
(1976)
8
Roxanne L. Euben. The Enemy in the Mirror. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), 21.
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as the two most important natural resources in the Middle East, and create a torrent of
charged interests to the region.
Chapter 2 is a discussion of the new religion of the world from the Western
perspective, the “religion of the market,” where the globalization and modernization
takes the place of the holy and sacred. The obscured view of the “war on terror”
occurs as a result of the US’ concern to protect and secure their economic, social, and
geopolitical powers on the world scene, specifically in the Middle East. The US’
current world economic strategy, known as “McWorld”, is represented through the
US’ frantic concern to control the world’s dwindling natural resources and to lock the
US dollar as the primary form of currency. Neo-conservatism and its founding father,
Leo Strauss, are discussed to provide a basis for where the US began its
interventionalist approach to foreign policy, followed by its percolation into the
White House beginning with President Ronald Reagan. The US’ current policies on
foreign affairs are elaborated on, looking at universality, the promotion of democracy,
and the agenda used to achieve its hidden interests.
Chapter 3 deconstructs the Islamic fundamental resistance to the world’s
current political systems and wielded structural pressure, described in Chapter 2. The
Wahhabi movement and Sayyid Qutb have influenced the Islamic fundamental
mindset in the Middle East due to their reaction against imperial forces through the
incorporation of religion and political mobilization. The Wahhabi movement began in
Saudi Arabia in the 18th century as a puritanical form of Islam, which traveled to
Afghanistan during the war in 1979 and remained a central facet to many of the
mujahidin trying to bring about a global Wahhabi campaign. Sayyid Qutb was an
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Egyptian Islamist fundamental thinker in the 20th century that called for a
revitalization of the jahiliyyah society, or state of barbarous ignorance that opposes
the Islamic constitution, state, and laws,9 which Qutb saw as the root for the world’s
current state of affairs. Both the Wahhabi movement and Sayyid Qutb called for a
reinstatement of Islam into the Western-influenced society that has strayed from
Islam’s values and morals according to shar’ia law, and fallen into a state of
jahiliyyah. The chapter concludes with a dialogue over these influential voices on
current Islamic fundamental mindsets, seen with Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda.
The current movement’s response to the West is framed in a similar fashion to the
previous thinkers’ responses to imperial influence. Conflict in the Middle East does
not concern differing civilizations or religions, but calls attention to the rapidly
changing world that, in some eyes, is seen as hazardous to all aspects of life.
Chapter 4 and 5 explain the tangible examples (natural resources), rather than
solely differing civilizations or religions, to explain the conflicts between the US and
Islamic fundamentalism. Chapter 4 details the complex relationship of the US and the
Persian Gulf, specifically in Saudi Arabia, over the control and flow of oil. A
historical outline of the US’ dependence on foreign oil is charted, followed by the
attempt of the US to create and maintain a force over oil and power in the Middle
East against the “oil sword” of Saudi Arabia. Chapter 5 describes the place of water
within the Israeli-Palestinian peace conflict and its force that remains at the heart of
the Israeli and Palestinian claim to nationhood. Palestine’s sources of water are
described, followed by its allocation to Israeli and Palestinian populations. Each
9

Wanttoknow.info. DaanSpeak. “Power of Nightmares-The Rise of the Politics of Fear.” Episode 1,
“Baby It’s Cold Outside.” http://www.daanspeak.com/TranscriptPowerOfNightmares1.html (Accessed
April 2, 2009)
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group equally needs adequate water sources to support the possibility of a strong and
prospering nation, which is one of the key factors in violence and conflict in
Palestine.

Literary Review
The general methodological theories that permeate through this thesis are ones
that discuss the misleading dichotomy of the “West” versus the “East” or “us” versus
“them.” Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis introduce the simplistic reason of the
“clash of civilizations” to explain the world’s conflicts in their articles titled “Clash of
Civilizations?” and “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” Their work is used to show the
subjective accusation that simplifies the conflict into a theoretical and mystified
concept, which rapidly grows in the general public opinion largely unnoticed.
Edward Said’s Orientalism, published in 1978, is used to analyze the Western
view towards the Middle East regarding the “us” versus “them” paradigm.10 The
definition of “Orientalism” is important for this discussion due to this topic’s
rejection of this imperialistic and oversimplified Orientalist view. Said’s work sheds
light on the break down of the Orientalist view that oversimplifies the differing
civilizations and cultures.
The literature in Chapter 1 is organized into the subsections of the two
theories, the secularization theory and the “clash of civilization.” Even though the
decline of religion has been hypothesized since the Enlightenment, and later
thoroughly defined as the secularization theory by Max Weber in the first half of the

10

Edward Said. Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978)
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20th century, the majority of literature discussing the theory was published after 1960.
Articles from the two magazines, Sociology of Religion and Social Forces, are used to
deconstruct the validity of the theory in order to give an accurate foundation for
readers concerning the secularization theory. Similarly from these two articles, I
looked at 20th century authors that refuted and supported the secularization theory and
thematically set up the chapter accordingly. Contributing authors to The Atlantic
Monthly supported and refuted the secularization theory, like David Brooks and Peter
Berger, which proves that literature on the theory is (first), expansive and has been
thoroughly analyzed, and (second), has transcended from solely academic circles to
media and political ones.
The literature for the subsection of the “clash of civilizations” begins in 1990
with Bernard Lewis’ article, “The Roots of Muslim Rage.”11 Samuel Huntington
develops Lewis’ theory of the “clash of civilizations” in his own article published in
Foreign Affairs in 1993 titled, “The Clash of Civilizations?” These two articles blend
together opinion and historical fact to weave a seemingly logical explanation for the
reasons why the “West” is in conflict with the “East.” Literature used to criticize the
theory comes from the author of Orientalism, Edward Said, and the Islamicist, Roy P.
Mottahedeh, and together are highly critical of Huntington’s generalizing methods
when explaining world conflict.
In order to bridge the chapter’s discussion of religion with Islam, two books
are used to introduce Islam and the Islamic fundamentalist movement. Francis
Robinson’s Max Weber and Islam is used to discuss Islam from Weber’s point of
view. Roxanne L. Euben’s Enemy in the Mirror is used to demonstrate Islamic
11

Bernard Lewis. “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” The Atlantic Monthly. 1990.

15

fundamentalism as a social science model rather than a solely theological one.
Modern rationalism influences the movement’s definition as a social science model,
which provides vital insight into the Islamic fundamental mindset. The rationalist
viewpoint also influences structural pressures exerted on Muslim nations. This
section of Chapter 1 helps lead into Chapter 2’s discussion of the US’ influence in
international affairs, explaining the origins and tangible policies of the rationalist
perspective.
The literature for Chapter 2 is comprised of quantitative and qualitative
research used to bolster the US’ interest for control over resources and power
internationally. Benjamin R. Barber’s term of “McWorld” is used to explain the US’
type of interest, while Noam Chomsky, Michael Klare, and William R. Clark are used
to detail the US’ dependence on foreign oil and its desire to maintain the US dollar’s
global position. For a historical understanding of the origins of the US’ foreign
policies and rationalized world, literature on Leo Strauss’ “natural right” is employed.
The documentary, The Power of Nightmares, is used to show one perception of the
US’ hidden international agenda, in addition to the basis for the final section
discussing the formed “hidden enemy.”
Chapter 3 uses primary and secondary sources to delve into the meaning
behind the grievances from the Muslim perspective concerning the modernized and
rationalized world. To frame the discussion on Islamic fundamentalism, the
Gramscian approach is used as a methodological tool to explain the Islamic
fundamentalist response to the US’ international strategy and perspective, seen in
Thomas R. Bates’ article titled, “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony.” Muslim
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perspectives from the 18th and 20th century reacting to imperial powers frames the
current Islamic fundamental mindset using the primary sources of Kitab al-Tawhid by
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab as well as Social Justice in Islam and Milestones by
Sayyid Qutb. Secondary sources provide analysis for each thinker’s rationale, seen in
Richard Booney’s Jihad, from Qur’an to Bin Laden and John Esposito’s Unholy War:
Terror in the Name of Islam. Stephen Schartz’s The Two Faces of Islam and the
documentary, The Power of Nightmares, are controversial sources due to their
subjective perspectives, yet are carefully used for their historical explanations. The
effect of these past Islamic thinkers is exposed through a discussion of Osama bin
Laden and Al-Qaeda, using Bruce Lawrence’s Messages to the World: The
Statements of Osama bin Laden as a primary source.
The literature of Chapter’s 4 and 5 also include quantitative and qualitative
data to demonstrate the influence of resources in conflicts in the Middle East.
Concerning Chapter 4’s discussion of oil, in 2004 and 2005 alone, twenty books were
published about the emerging crisis of oil as a dwindling natural resource.12 For this
thesis, I used two of Michael Klare’s books titled, Blood and Oii, and Resource Wars.
Blood and Oil discusses the relationship between the US and its dependence on oil,
mainly foreign, and the numerous consequences it will have for the US’ future. 13
Resource Wars discusses oil and other natural resources that are being demanded by
the world’s growing populations and consumption rates. 14 Klare highlights the
sizeable influence that resources have on conflicts in regions around the world,
12

“The Power of Community: How Cuba Survived Peak Oil.” Copyright Community Service, Inc. 53
mins. www.communitysolution.org/cuba accessed April 6, 2009
13
Michael Klare. Blood and Oil
14
Michael Klare. Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: Metropolitan
Books, 2001)
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clashing over oil, water, timber, gems and minerals. Resources become a geopolitical
concern for nations that depend on the resources for their nation’s livelihood.
Matthew R. Simmons’ book titled, Twilight in the Desert, and Steven
Emerson’s book titled, The American House of Saud: The Secret Petrodollar
Connection, both touch on the US’ alliance with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia over
the control and availability of oil. 15 While Emerson’s book must be looked at as a
subjective source due to its slanted perspective on the Saudi regime, the two works
give extensive history and background on the US’ influence over oil and control in
Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the 20th century.
For the discussion of water, the article titled, “Religion, State, and the
International System in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” provides an important
groundwork for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, highlighting the nationalist and statist
relations as the source of conflict rather than for religious or theological reasons. 16
Water rights directly influence the goal of a nation or state, yet in Palestine are
unequally distributed throughout the region’s populations siding either with the plight
of the Israelis or Palestinians. Herbert C. Kelman’s chapter in the book, Islam,
Judaism, and the Political Role of Religion the Middle East17, deconstructs the idea of
national identity and its meaning for each group.

15

Matthew R. Simmons. Twilight in the Desert: The Steven Emerson. The American House of Saud:
The Secret Petrodollar Connection (New York: New Republic, 1985) Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the
World Economy (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2005),
16
Hillel Frisch, Shmuel Sandler, “Religion, State, and the International System in the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict.” International Political Science Review, Vol. 25, no. 1 (January 2004),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601623,
17
Herbert C. Kelman. “National Identity and the Role of the ‘Other’ in Existential Conflicts: The
Israeli-Palestinian Case,” in Islam, Judaism and the Political Role of Religion in the Middle East,
edited by John Bunzl, 61-74. Florida: University Press of Florida, 2004.
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I used three articles that provide quantitative data for understanding the water
sources in Palestine, and the allotted amount for Israelis and Palestinians. Hillel
Shuval’s article in the spring 2000 edition of Arab Studies Quarterly gives a general
overview of the quantitative data of the region’s wells and springs, amount of,
sources of, and its production and consumption rates of water. 18 Nadav Morag’s
article the Middle Eastern Quarterly in 200119 offers the discussion of water rights
from the Israeli perspective, while Munther J. Haddadin’s article in The Geographical
Journal in 200220 presents the water rights from the Palestinian perspective. The three
authors are crucial for their quantitative research concerning the water sources in
Palestine.
By bridging together topics ranging from philosophy, politics, Islamic theory,
and natural resources, my thesis proves to demonstrate the power and influence of
natural resources in our current world. In the 21st century, the current conflicts are the
Islamic fundamentalist response to the structural pressures from natural resources
controlled by Western influences. This perceived confrontation is not due to differing
religions or civilizations, but to an evolving society that deems tradition as more
important than modernization.

18

Hillel I. Shuval. “A proposal for an equitable resolution to the conflicts between the Israelis and the
Palestinians over the shared water resources of the mountain aquifer.” Arab Studies Quarterly.
Belmont: Spring 2000, Vol. 22, Iss. 2, pg. 33.
19
Nadav Morag. “Water, Geopolitics and State Building: The Case of Israel.” Middle Eastern
Quarterly, Vol. 37, no. 3, (July 2001).
20
Munther Haddadin. “Water in the Middle East Peace Process.” The Geographical Journal, Vol. 168,
No. 4, Water Wars? Geographical Perspectives. December 2002. 324-340.
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Chapter 1
Religion as the Source for Conflict?
Introduction
Since the Enlightenment of the 17th century, the place of religion in society
has been the subject of much debate. Thomas Woolston, an English deist of the 17th
century, theorized that modernity would prevail over the Christian faith by 1900.21
Yet in the 20th century, a German sociologist named Max Weber pioneered the term
“the secularization theory” stating that society in the 20th century is less dependent on
the authority of religion as a position of authority and religion has lost its past social
significance.22 According to A Dictionary of Sociology, religion is measured “by
religious attendance, commitment to orthodox belief, support for organized religion in
terms of payments, membership, and respect.”23 Frank J. Lechner, a critic of the
actual premise of the theory, defines secularization as “a general theory of societal
change, consisting of a coherent body of empirical generalizations that rests on
fundamental Weberian premise.” Lechner notes that religion in Western societies
experienced a decline “in cultural and social influence of religious ideas and
institutions.”24 Lechner also observes the importance of the emergence of
rationalization that changes certain societies transcendental worldviews, becoming
deeply sacralized.25
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Rodney Stark. “Secularization, R.I.P.” Sociology of Religion, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), 249.
Andrew Giddings. “The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion by Peter
Berger.” INDS 581: Christian Faith and Practice in a (Post) Modern World. Craig M. Gay
23
Gordon Marshall. “secularization.” A Dictionary of Sociology, 1998.
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O88-secularization.html accessed April 11, 2009
24
Frank J. Lechner. “The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal.” Social Forces, Vol. 69, No. 4
(Jun., 1991), 1106.
25
Ibid. 1104.
22
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The root of the secularization theory developed from the Weberian view of
rationality within the Christian West. According to the theory, rationality increases
with the “human capacity to calculate and to control all aspects of life without appeals
either to traditional norms or to charismatic enthusiasm.”26 As the economy, legal
system, and society move towards a more rational and technological form of living,
individuals rely less on religion to control their lives, known as Weber’s
“disenfranchisement of the world”27. “To find direction, and to win security in this
world and the next, the human being no longer needs either to revere or coerce the
spirits.”28 Science also explains natural and cultural facets of the world, downgrading
religion’s importance in public life, and creating a “fragmentation of human
[understandings] of the world.”29 Religion is forced out of economic, political, and
social conduct, is separated from private and public life, and no longer stands as one
large, cohesive entity. Disenchantment and fragmentation of human understandings
of the world characterize the secularization theory as its main themes concerning the
change of religion in society.
The majority of Max Weber’s work is a unique Western development
centering in Western Europe, yet holds great importance for looking at secularization
theory in the Islamic world. Through the Weberian lens of the modern Western vision
of studying the civilizations, rationalist views, and capitalist theories, Islam is used as

26

Francis Robinson. “Secularization, Weber, and Islam.” In Max Weber and Islam, ed. Toby E. Huff
and Wolfgang Schluchter (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 231.
27
Frank J. Lechner. “The Case against Secularization: A Rebuttal.” 1106.
28
Ibid
29
Ibid.
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the anomaly to explain why they did not developed in Islam.30 While S.N. Eisenstadt
believes that Weber’s understanding and description of Islam in civilizations is
wrong31, his concept of Islam in relation to the secularization in societies is vital for
our discussion.
The next section will look at the secularization theory, including a general
critique of the theory, followed by its rejection and support by numerous authors, and
ending with the application of secularization to the Islamic world. Samuel
Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” will follow the Weberian perspective on
secularization in the Islamic world to further understand religion’s place.

Criticisms of the actual theory of secularization
In Jeffrey K. Hadden’s article, “Toward Descralizing Secularization Theory,”
Hadden finds numerous challenges to the secularization theory. The basis for Weber’s
theory rests on the ‘presuppositions . . . [that] represent a taken-for-granted ideology’
of social scientists ‘rather than a systematic set of interrelated propositions.’”32 It is
“causally” used as a link between the decline of religion and modernization, yet no
definitive link is given to hold the two together other than the proposition of their
relation as an “orienting concept.”33 Religion is also difficult to qualitatively measure
because of its subjective nature, noting Charles Glock’s opinion: “It is extremely
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doubtful that accurate statistics can be produced through manipulating the unreliable
ones.”34 Religious movements of the 1960’s and 1970’s in the US and Europe, like
the new Christian and Eastern religious revivals, are improperly used to support the
theory, and instead are the result of a socially constructed counterculture. Finally,
religion is described in privatized terms, or the religion meant for the individual,
which downplays its influence in politics, seen in issues such as Catholics versus
Protestants in Northern Ireland, Muslims versus Jews in Palestine, and the fanatical
overthrow of the Shah of Iran.35 Reasons for conflict are reduced to ethnic hostilities
rather than taking into account the effect of religion.
Hadden’s four challenges to the secularization theory draw back to his
conclusion that the theory is “very much a product of the social and cultural milieu
from which it emerged.” Corresponding to Hadden’s critical stance against the
theory, the works of a professor of sociologist at Emory University, Frank J. Lechner,
is used to discern criticisms concerning the secularization theory. Frank J. Lechner
provides five criticisms for the theory in his article titled, “The Case Against
Secularization Theory: A Rebuttal.”36 Lechner’s main argument against
secularization theory states that the theory claims “to account for societal variations in
secularization, relying on contingent features of social change and religious
arrangements in different societies.”37 Lechner supports Hadden’s criticism as
valuable insights to the discussion of secularization, yet disagrees with the way in
which he approaches the debate.
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Contrary to Hadden, Lechner views the secularization theory as more of a
“coherent theory, Weberian in inspiration and based on a century of collective
scholarly activity.”38 The historical presupposition of religion having a “golden age”
ignores the fact that new religions and religious behaviors have not ceased and are
reoccurring. The secularization theory interprets religious decline in Western societies
to degeneration rather than to religious transformation that brings about a search for
new gods.
Looking generally at the secularization theory, Lechner criticizes the status
and existence of the theory. He believes that religious revivals do not have an indirect
relationship with secularism, and are based off of local phenomena. Religious
fundamentalism exists to reverse secularization and to restore a religious order to the
secularized world. It is given a purpose to desecularize in the purpose-lacking secular
world. Social and cultural strengths of religious institutions account for the local
phenomenon of religious fundamentalism, rather than on account of the actual
secularization process.39
Lechner’s final claim is that secularization theory is irrelevant, and globalism
is the culprit for creating a new world order and global change. The secularization
theory must be treated “as at best a partial account of a part of the overall process of
global change and as a problematic component of global culture.”40 The
secularization theory cannot merely apply to individual societies, but must encompass
a new ‘global theory.’ It needs to move out of the idea that everything initially came
from the Middle Ages “Christendom” as Western-centered, rooted in Christian origin.
38
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Whether the secularization theory is true or false, a discussion of both sides will be
necessary to supplement religion’s role in world.

Is religion is declining or thriving?
There is a varied amount of scholarship concerning the support of the
secularization theory, seen by authors such as Bryan Wilson, Thomas Luckman,
Karel Dubbelaere, Mark Chaves, and Peter Berger. The opinions of Mark Chaves and
Peter Berger in support of the secularization theory will follow that add valuable
insights to this side of the theory.
Seen in Peter Berger’s book titled, The Sacred Canopy, Berger supports
secularization theory and sees religion as declining. He argues that humans require a
“‘sacred canopy’ in order to make sense of the world, because meaninglessness is a
threat to our need for an orderly universe.”41 Berger agrees to an extent that religion is
reemerging due to the importance of religion as an “internal supporting structure,” to
society, known as a process of legitimating. His notion of reality and individuals
creates legitimizations that “answer the ‘why’ questions concerning ‘institutional
arrangements.’”42 Legitimating “reinforce the what’s and the why’s of society” as
new people become a part of the religion as well as during a crisis, either collective or
individual, where “the veil between meaning and chaos grows particularly thin.”
Legitimations are supported by plausibility structures, being specific social processes
that reinforce and reconstruct the legitimate world, such as religion. If a plausibility
41
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structure is weak, legitimations must be strong and sophisticated, speaking of
religion’s influence to explain the why’s and what’s about life. And likewise, if the
plausibility structure is strong, then a relatively simple legitimation is needed, thus
possibly a relatively simple explanation of the what’s and why’s of the world.
Berger’s view of religion is one that is described by religions power to “ ‘locate’
human phenomena within a cosmic frame of reference.”
However, theodicy, defined by Berger as the explanations given of suffering,
evil, and death in terms of religious legitimations, is the greatest task when explaining
religious legitimation because of anthropodicy. With the move away from
Catholicism, Protestantism divided the world into secular and sacred spheres that
pluralized society. Competition within the religious realm over plausibility structures
broke down the order of the world that used to have an “over-arching idea of truth,”
while in the end religion became relativized. Theology as a whole becomes criticized,
with the orthodox side trying to “[assert] the objectivity of Biblical revelation.” These
orthodox resurgences are “merely interruptions in the secularization process.”
Interestingly, in 1997 Berger took back his support for the secularization
theory, noting the improper correlation between secularization and modernity. “There
is some evidence for it. But I think it’s basically wrong. Most of the world today is
certainly not secular. It’s very religious.”43
Through the work of Mark Chaves, secularization theory has evolved from
the decline in religion to the decline in religious authority.44 In Chaves’ article titled,
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“Secularization as Declining Religious Authority,”45 he describes secularization
theory as reformulated in a differing manner in his “new differentiation theory”46 than
its classical perception portrays.47 Within religion’s new definition, societal spheres
that secularization theory claims to harm religion, like the state or science, do not
undermine religion. “ Secularization occurs, or not, as the result of social and political
conflicts between those social actors who would enhance or maintain religion’s social
significance and those who would reduce it.”48 A religious authority’s legitimation
can exist from this power, while its power is called upon by a supernatural referent.
“Secularization as declining religious authority, then, will refer to the declining
influence of social structures whose legitimation rests on reference to the
supernatural.”49
Numerous individuals believe that humanity is experiencing a growth in
religious zeal opposite the secularization theory that hypothesized the decline of
religion. The first to deny secularization theory was in 1965 by David Martin, a
contemporary sociologist.50
The contemporary journalist for The Atlantic Monthly, David Brooks, holds
the anti-secularist view in the article, “Kicking the Secularist Habit.”51 Brooks notes
numerous successes in the religious world concerning an increase in religious fervor.
For instance, “Orthodox Judaism grows among young people, and Israel has gotten
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more religious as it has become more affluent,”52 as well as the success of Philip
Jenkins’s career as a proponent for Christianity’s international growth in the 20th
century. Brooks also claims that denominations that refuse to adapt to secularism are
growing the fastest, including ecstatic forms of Christianity and “anti-modern” Islam.
Rodney Stark, a fellow Atlantic reporter and sociologist, also argues against
the secularization theory, stating that “the vision of a religionless future is but
illusions.”53 Stark does not agree with the secularization theory’s reciprocal
relationship between modernization and religious belief. In his article titled,
“Secularization R.I.P.,” he attributes and disproves five notions against the theory: the
myth of the religious decline, the myth of past piety, the failure to Christianize,
subjective religiousness, and the relationship of science and religion.
First, there is a universal agreement that modernization, which includes
industrialization, urbanization, and rationalization, will lead to a religious decline.
This assumes that modernization is a short, quick and immediate process, when in
fact it’s a “long, gradual, relatively constant process,”54 making the secularization
theory extraneous. Societies are affected by multiple reasons other than
modernization that can affect religious participation. A “myth” of religious decline, as
well as a decline in religious piety, is created due to false and inaccurate data “ based
in part on very exaggerated perceptions of past religiousness.”55
Second, the secularization theory focuses on individual piety and belief, and
does not concern institutional differentiation. Today religious institutions, like the
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Catholic Church, have less political power than they once had. Likewise,
secularization theorists believe that as the power of religious institutions decrease, so
will personal piety. However, Stark feels that this focus is historically false and
insincere, and cites Karel Dobbelaere’s criticism that personal piety is not a valid
indicator of religiosity. “The religiousness of individuals is not a valid indicator in
evaluating the process of secularization.”56 For Dobbelaere, secularization is a
societal-level process, “driven by functional differentiation, to which religious
organizations and individuals react.”57 Important to note is Stark’s mention of the
subjectivity of religiosity for every individual, which should follow a certain doctrine.
The lack of stereotypical religious participation, like attending church, does not
correlate with the extent of a church goers faith.58
Third, there is a presumed incompatibility between religion and science, and
that science “has the most deadly implications for religion.”59 By using a
questionnaire from the 1914 article in Nature by American psychologist James
Lueba, Stark noted that scientists are not “notably irreligious.”60 The findings
concluded that, “over an 82-year period, there has been no decline in a very literal
belief in God among scientists.”61 Thus according to Lueba and used by Stark,
religion has not been on the decline in the science community, which further negates
the secularization theory.
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Fourth, Stark notes the secularization theory’s focus on Christianity.
Discussion of the secularization theory must be broader than just Christianity and
must study other religions and cultures globally.62 With respect to Islam’s religious
revival, Stark claims the compatibility of the Islamic faith and modernization, and
even its religious commitment, as increasing with modernization.63 A study done by
Joseph Tamney looking at Islam in Java, Indonesia, concluded that “religious
commitment was positively correlated with education and with occupational
prestige.”64 People with a college education or with a high status occupation were
more likely to participate in Islamic practices than people with little education and
low status occupations. Stark concludes that modernization will not be the reason for
the demise of faith, and the secularization theory will remain as a “product of wishful
thinking.”65
The two sides to over secularization theory represent the expansive influence
that religion, or the lack of religion, has on a society. The US and Europe represent
societies that have become more secular in the past 100 years, while many poor
developing nations show a surge in religiosity such as nations in Africa and Asia. Phil
Zuckerman, a professor of sociology at Pitzer College, asserts that secularization
theory must only be thought of as a possibility since no social phenomenon is
inevitable. A society is constantly moving in a circular motion regarding social
phenomenon, including religion’s place within a society. Religion is regarded as one
possible perspective concerning secularization in the West, according to Francis

62

Ibid. 253.
Ibid. 267.
64
Ibid. 268.
65
Ibid. 269.
63

30

Robinson in “Secularization, Weber, and Islam.”66 Secularization theory holds many
different pathways concerning ideology, nationalism, and religious change.67

Secularization Theory in the Islamic World
In the current discussion of religion’s place in the Islamic world, the
secularization theory is both supported and refuted. Ernest Gellner’s forward to Islam,
Globalization, and Postmodernity states that the secularization theory applies to Islam
and argues that the Islamic world holds religion to a different degree for its
incorporation into everyday life. It varies from country to country, and occurs in
socially radical countries as well as fundamental ones as a result to modernization.
However, in Abubaker A. Bagader’s chapter titled, “Contemporary Islamic
movements in the Arab world,” 68 he refutes the notion that secularization theory
applies to Islam, stating that Islam retains control between the secular and the sacred
keeping them indivisible.69
By adopting Weber’s perspectives of disenfranchisement and fragmentation, a
clearer picture is illustrated when understanding the secularization theory from the
perspective from the Islamic world. As Francis Robinson noted, disenfranchisement
and fragmentation occur on structural levels concerning the law, learning and power,
as well as in subjective terms from the consciousness of human beings. However,
these classifications are from the Christian Europe perspective in addition to the fact
that secularization “was a consequence of the projection of Western capital and power
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into the Islamic world from 1800 onward.”70 Muslim societies learned to adapt to the
Christian West’s form of secularization rather than creating their own due their
entanglement with Western economic influence, power, and thought. The
secularization theory develops with Islam as a different world than Weber’s Christian
West.
According to Weber’s secularization theory Islam, must be looked at in terms
of its society in which Islam exists. The level of religiosity in Islamic societies should
be measured by the extent to which they follow shari’a (the body of Islamic law as a
theocracy), and its secularity should be looked at according the degree that it does not
follow shari’a.71 However, the use of the shari’a in the 19th and 20th centuries has
changed dramatically for numerous reasons in every Muslim society, including the
“[fuelling] by continuing movements of reform, by vast increases in the availability
of Islamic knowledge, and by favourable economic and social changes, which have
brought Muslims to live lives closer to the shari’a.”72 A process of Islamization
occurs, which supports the notion of secularization in Islamic terms as well as
existing as “notable a feature of recent Islamic developments, as one fo
secularizations, following Weber’s theory of secularization.”73
As an example of “extremist factions,” Islamic fundamentalism must be
understood in terms of its definition to oppose modern rationalism.74 According to
Roxanne Euben, discourse surrounding Islamic fundamentalism “interprets and
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structures political life through the opposition of a notion of rationality to irrationality
derived from distinctively Western moments in modern political and social
thought.”75 The grievances among Islamic fundamentalists are generated from the
reactions against the process of modernization and from their expectations of greater
opportunities for advancement.76 Roxanne Euben also notes the emerging Islamic
fundamentalists as the overeducated and underemployed class that might have led the
modernization process, and are now gravitating towards “the extremes of political
action, attracted toward the instruments of propaganda, agitation and violence.”77
Through this understanding, the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism is
deconstructed to reveal the power of the movement to perceive itself as solely
situated in “the imperative of divine sovereignty and absolute truths of revelation.”78
The often-misinterpreted assumption that Islamic fundamentalism is a reaction to
political or socioeconomic circumstances reinforce the neglect of the movement’s
system of ideas “as a substantive vision for the world.”79 The total effects acting on
Islamic fundamentalism must be looked at to determine the origins of the movement.
By examining the different views on secularization theory, one can conclude
that the level of religiosity of a culture or society cannot alone explain current
conflicts. While religion holds a significant place in society, the degree of a religion’s
place in a culture cannot be correlated with conflict since religion and culture are
subjective for every individual and nation. The following section will discuss
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alternative reasons for conflict, such as Samuel Huntington’s theory of the “clash of
civilizations,” which theorizes that civilizations, cultures, and religions collide
because of their differing civilizations, cultures, and religions.

A Clash of Civilizations?
In the post-Cold War era of the 20th century, Samuel Huntington was the
leading American political scientist to explain the world’s current state of conflict.
From his well-known thesis on the new world order outlined in an article published in
Foreign Affairs in 1993 titled, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Huntington asserts that
culture, rather than ideological or economic reasons, is the fundamental source of
conflict.80 In the article, Huntington fleshed out the phrase, “the clash of
civilizations,” from Bernard Lewis’ coinage of it in the latter article’s titled, “The
Roots of Muslim Rage,” which appeared in the September 1990 issue of The Atlantic
Monthly. Lewis stresses that “Muslim rage” is targeted at the US due to “ [an]
irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian
heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.”81 After
September 11, the “clash of civilizations” theory was used to explain the motives for
the attack, attributing it to “a new war between the Islamic world and the (mostly)
Christian West.”82 Seen in an October 2001 interview with bin Laden and Taysir
Alluni, al-Jazeera’s most celebrated reporter, bin Laden agrees that the conflict is a
“clash of civilizations.”83 “This [Clash of Civilizations] is a very clear matter, proven

80

Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” 22.
Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage.” 60.
82
Michael Klare. Blood and Oil. 54.
83
Osama bin Laden. “Terror for Terror.”124.
81

34

in the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet, and any true believer who claims to be
faithful shouldn’t doubt these truths, no matter what anybody says about them.”84 Not
only is this theory accepted in Western mindset, but in Muslim perspectives as well.
Huntington defines a civilization as a cultural entity that belongs to a village,
region, ethnic group, nationality and religious group, which is “the highest cultural
grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity.”85 According to
Huntington, these differences will separate civilizations from one another, resulting in
world conflict. Under the subtext of culture, Huntington notes religion to be the most
important difference: “[Religious differences] are far more fundamental than
differences among political ideologies and political regimes.”86 After the fall of the
Iron Curtain, the world became divided into two religious civilizations: Western
Christianity on one side, and Orthodox Christianity and Islam on the other.87
Separation because of religion became the culprit for conflict, further instigating the
idea of “us” versus “them,” and idea for which Huntington was highly criticized. His
hypothesis builds on this notion of difference to imply that these cultural and
religious differences indicate an equal difference over policy issues, ranging from
human rights, territory claims, and political systems. Groups, governments, and
nations will attempt to appeal to the “common religion and civilization identity” of
the battle in order to rally support for “relative military and economic power, struggle
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over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively
promote their particular political and religious values.”88
Huntington does not see the “clash of civilizations” as a recent event, but one
that has existed for 1,300 years. With the foundation of Islam in the seventh century,
the civilization moved westward, conflicted with the Crusaders from the eleventh to
the thirteenth centuries, and later experienced a surge of tension between the Ottoman
Empire and the colonial powers of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. “In the
Arab world, in short, Western democracy strengthens anti-Western political forces . .
. [complicating] relations between Islamic countries and the West.”89
The discourse to explain Huntington’s hypothesis is inherently set up to
differentiate the “West” from the “the rest,” based off of Kishore Mahbubani’s
phrase. 90 A discriminating and polarized image of the US as a ‘superpower’ is
created, which is problematic to the rest of the world that cannot compare in its
policies of economics, politics, military, society etc. Differences in the power and
struggle for military, economic, and institutional power are the sources for conflict,
and are a consequence of one’s civilization.91 In conclusion, Huntington views
civilization and culture as the basis for the majority of world conflict, and sees it as
“a central focus of conflict for the immediate future [to be] between the West and
several Islamic-Confucian states.”92
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Critiques of the “Clash of Civilizations”
Currently, Huntington’s explanation for conflict is widely disputed and often
disregarded as a credible commentary for modern political theory. The two essays,
“The Clash of Definitions,” by Edward Said, literary critic and author of Orientalism,
and, “The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique.” by Roy P. Mottahedeh,
provide a literary critic’s of Western and an Islamicist’s assessment, respectively, to
which we can turn for the noteworthy critiques of Huntington’s article and latter,
book.
The authors’ initial complaints are Huntington’s generalizing language and its
attempted use ineffective evidence. According to Said, Huntington does not remain
neutral in his rhetoric and oversimplifies ideas that he uses to create “easy-to-quoteand-remember ideas.”93 His figurative and easily-conveyed images perpetuate the
world of a polarity between “us” and “them” that are supposedly destined to clash.
Even more questions are brought up and unexplained due to his evidence being found
to be lacking in scholarly research. Historical evidence is asserted be to “natural” and
“epistemological,” when in reality, it is “constructed” and “situational.”94 Mottahedeh
agrees with Said’s view of Huntington’s sweeping generalizations, yet emphasizes his
poorly constructed use of examples. As an Islamicist, this is, one who studies Islam
and Muslim studies, Mottahedeh’s initial dilemma concerns the ambiguous examples
from the Islamic world. 95 Huntington’s examples do not show a proper theoretical
correlation between the relationship of “culture” and political behavior. For example,
Huntington claims that tense relations between the Arab world and the West will not
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cease due to the history of its centuries-old militaristic hostilities.96 However,
Mottahedeh casts light on the reality of this historical claim in pointing out that the
most important conflicts in the past centuries were between the West and the Ottoman
Turks, who can hardly be classified as “Arab.”97
The second dispute shared by Said and Mottahedeh relates to Huntington’s
neglect in acknowledging the presence of counter-culture in civilizations. Said asserts
the existence of the counter-culture that must be given importance because there will
always be a group contradicting to the norm.98 The ultimate fault lies in assuming the
homogeneity between culture and identity, as doing so ignores the complex
relationship between them. Mottahedeh sees Islamists as Islam’s counter-culture, who
“[call] for some degree of reimposition of Islamic law and tend to view the West as a
more or less unified and universal ‘alien civilization’ to be treated in the spirit of the
clash of civilizations.”99 Islamists as a counter-culture also have another counterculture within themselves concerning opinions of foreign policy, yet remain a
minority within the larger Islamic ummah, or community.
The third complaint is Huntington’s strategy to identify and define
civilizations. Huntington uses the term, “civilizational identity,” to encompass a wide
range of people under an umbrella of a stereotypical type of culture. He lists them as
Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and
African civilizations.100 The mere relationship of a culture and a civilization is
already complex, Said notes, which Huntington ignores as he tries to separate and
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define each term under one of eight civilizations. Huntington views these two terms
as “a sort of ontological fact of political existence,” which is far from the truth. As
François Burgat notes, the West overlooks the negative side of the clash of
civilizations and “the disturbing effect of marginalization of cultural and linguistic
codes within these societies [go] virtually unnoticed.”101
Additionally, even to define identity is difficult since is occurs as an
invention and construction. Along with Mottahedeh’s opinions, Said notes
Huntington’s conflation of Arabs and Muslims that results in the assertion that all
Muslims behave similarly to Muslim Arabs. Mottahedeh uses numerous examples of
nations in the Muslim world that did not behave according to Islamic tradition, like
the election of a woman as prime minister in Turkey in 1996. Thus by assuming that
every Muslim nation acts like the other is simply ignorant and generalizing. Said also
refutes Huntington’s claim that the idea of a free market has little effect on Islamic
cultures. Pre-Ottoman Islamic societies were free market economies, thus
Huntington’s identification of the Arab civilization as not embracing this market
strategy cannot be correct.
Said’s final disagreement with Huntington follows his own work concerning
the Orientalist view that creates feelings of hostility against the area of the world with
a strategic position for purposes of colonization, and more recently, in the oil market.
The Western portrayal of Muslims as terrorists and fundamentalists creates a dividing
space. Said’s work creates a discourse that refutes the claim that civilizations and
cultures are the reason for conflict in our world, which aids the discussion over the
polarized depiction of the Western powers versus the non-Western powers. Rather
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than defining the reason for conflict, Said identifies the reasons why conflict is not
caused by culture or civilization that includes the war over resources.

The location of the holy
Both secularization theory and the clash of civilizations represent the
changing place of the ‘holy’ in people’s lives. The holy, or sacred, arises from human
experiences reflecting social experiences, alerting one to the changing society that can
be influenced by a multitude of factors. 102According to secularization theory, religion
is declining, thriving, or evolving as a result of the current world’s state of affairs.
The debates about secularization . . . seem to revolve around the question
of whether we are in a state of affairs in which the holy has disappeared
from our horizons, or whether the older locations of the holy have proven
inadequate and instead those activities which were once deemed secular
have now become the marks of the sacred. 103
According to Huntington’s argument, the holy, according to different civilizations, is
instigating conflicts between groups.
Max L. Stackhouse defines the holy in his article titled, “The Location of the
Holy,” which discusses the justifications for basic moral stances and what it deemed
“holy” in society. “The sense of holy provides the basis for those ‘background
beliefs’ that sustain or transform our standards for evaluation, analysis and action, and
thereby give substance to our basic moral stances.”104 The sense of the holy provides
the legitimacy for societal structures and the fabric of everyday life.105 The “really
real”, or the reality that is structured based on one’s insights, sensibilities, traditions,
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or procedures, is debatable in our time, especially what can be deemed holy.
Additionally, this notion of the holy is not defined as a spiritual injection or
attendance of church service, but “in a broader sense present wherever fundamental
questions of what is ultimately powerful and worth in life are debated.”106
Scientists, theorists, psychologists, and philosophers have posed the question
of the holy’s location since its very existence, inventing and theorizing alternative
locations for the basic ethical stance. This questioning exists as an expression of that
individual or group’s psychological predisposition to which they belong: “What is
deemed holy is ‘actually’ the social, psychological or biophysical conditions out of
which stances develop as epiphenomena.”107 The 20th century experienced
widespread social change, which communicates the differing view of the holy in
accordance with the “drive for social change from the exposure of the biases, the
interests, the lusts for power, gain, and dominance that are present in widely accepted
moral stances and in their supporting marks of holiness.”108 Differing views of the
holy lead to differing moral stances, each considering one’s view as correct and the
other as incorrect, creating a moral dilemma for the group with differing views.

Conclusion
From the above arguments, the root of our world’s numerous conflicts is not
attributed to the degree of religion’s place in a society, seen in the secularization
theory, or its opposition to another religion, as Huntington theorizes. The search for
understanding the reasons for cause of conflict must be directed towards the world’s
106

Ibid. 71
Ibid. 72
108
Ibid.
107

41

new type of ‘religion’, one that is grounded in economic and political reasons: natural
resources. Natural resources support the life of a nation in every sphere, from its
agricultural sustainability to its numerous forms of energy and power. The following
section will look at the US’ hegemonic global drive to maintain its status and power
on the world scene. The protection of access to the availability and flow of resources
lies at the heart of the US’ influence and position in the Middle East to secure its flow
of oil.
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Chapter 2: The View from the US

Introduction
Natural resources are vital for every nation in order to carry out basic human
needs and survive the global economic market. Developed nations that have
exhausted their own resources are now relying on the resources concentrated in
developing nations.109 Issues of environmental stress and resource management will
result because of the widening gap between the industrial, developed nations and the
developing nations.110 Globalization will bring ‘”deepening economic stagnation,
political instability, and cultural alienation,’ which will ‘foster ethnic, ideological, and
religious extremism,’” with the majority of the violence directed against the US.111
These factors have the power to “divide worldwide publics and challenge US
leadership.”112
As of 2005, the United States’ GDP was the highest in the world, amounting
to approximately $10.5 trillion compared with the world’s overall GDP of $32
trillion. “[The US] is in fact the most absolute global power ever seen for its reach,
influence, and control. The US is rightly regarded as the unchallenged
superpower.”113 Yet despite the US’ towering economic superiority in the world, in
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2004 its trade gap was $665.9 billion, a 6% increase from 2003 of $496.5 billion. 114
The job market also experienced a drop, loosing 1.1 million jobs between 2001 and
2004, representing 7.4% of the population in contrast to the previous 5.6%.115 The
relocation of jobs and trade outside the US affected the decline, which weakens the
domestic market that needs these monetary assets within the US. Structural imbalance
in the US economy instilled fear in the Bush administration, prompting a possible
decline in the US’ economic international power and the influence in controlling the
depleting hydrocarbons. Before the Cold War, the US’ main doctrine was the
maintenance of a global system of alliances against at the communist Soviet Union,
subordinating the pursuit of the US’ national interests to protect the world from
communism. Yet with the end of the Cold War, US security policy changed to
accommodate America’s security interests, including the access to overseas supplies
and the production of oil. 116
The US’ desire to maintain its hegemonic power through the protection of
resources is seen with the “war on terror,” which places blame on differing religions
and civilizations for the conflicts rather than on the control for resources.117 The
Olduvai theory states that the life of our industrial civilization is only meant to last
approximately 100 years, from 1930 until 2030.118 While its claims are questionable,
it highlights the US’ fear of the quick depletion of the world’s oil supplies that could
cripple the US’ international power. These deceptions must be broken apart that
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“flow very naturally from the ways in which power is concentrated,”119 must be
broken apart. The following section will detail the US’ current economic state
through the discussion of resources and the dollar, followed by the explanation of the
US’ interventionalist approach to securing these issues.

The US’ driving forces
Resources
The first driving force to protect the US’ hegemonic status in the world is the
control of the world’s major energy resources, specifically oil as a “stupendous
source of strategic power” known since the 1940’s.120 Zbigniew Brzezinski notes that
US control over oil in Middle East “gives it indirect but politically critical leverage on
the European and Asian economies that are also dependent on energy exports from
the region.”121 US political leverage allows for a more powerful economy and
military, which become vital to the US doctrine as a powerful, dominating nation.
However, to ensure military and economic strengths, the insatiable hunger for oil
must be satisfied and can only be accomplished by the international quest for energy.
John C. Gannon, the deputy director of the CIA in 1996 remarks, “We have to
recognize that our nation will not be secure if global energy supplies are not
secure.”122
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As of 2004, the US made up 5% of the world’s total population that consumed
25% of the world’s total supply of oil,123 and consumed 30% of all raw materials by
human population in 1998.124 In 2004, the Department of Energy’s Annual Energy
Outlook concluded that US oil consumption will rise from 19.7 million barrels per
day in 2001 to 28.3 million barrels a day in 2025, increasing by 44% in 24 years.125
At the same time, domestic oil production will decrease from 5.7 to 4.6 million
barrels a day.
The excessive American lifestyle of a large home, large and multiple cars, and
a never-ending supply of material goods are the motivations for American’s high
consumption rate. “The single biggest factor in our ever-increasing dependency on
foreign oil is our seemingly endless capacity to consume,” notes former deputy
secretary of the Treasury Stuart E. Eizenstat in 2002.126 The current levels of
consumption are not healthy to sustain any wealth-oriented nation, especially the
United States.127 Two-thirds of the US’ petroleum usage goes to transportation, which
only increases as the demand and usage of cars increases, 13.5 million barrels a day
in 2001 to an estimated 20.7 million barrels a day in 2025.128
America is dependent on foreign resources also to support its military that has
the most technologically advanced defense capabilities.129 The US military provides
an unrivaled ability to venture across the world unchallenged by any other nation.
Constant and innovative technology is needed to support the US’ access to resources
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thus war to protect them is vital for America and its international capitalist
adventurism. “Most-if not all- technological innovation is driven by the aim of the US
military establishment to remain far ahead of other nations in the cutting edge of
military capability.”130

Globalization’s Effect on resource availability
In the global sense, the world is expanding at an astronomical rate with a
dramatic increase in the human population that drives the demand for resources. Over
the past fifty years, the human population grew from 2.6 billion in 1950 to 6 billion
people in 1999. By 2010, the world’s population is expected to increase to 6.8 billion
people, and in 2020 to 8 billion people.131 Increased consumption also produces to an
increase in the gross world product (GWP), which only a portion of the world’s
population benefits from because of globalization. With an exponential growing
population, an equally increasing demand for resources will result, putting an even
larger burden on the world.
However, with the US’ growing consumption rates and declining domestic
production, the US will have to look to foreign suppliers, weakening the nation
through foreign dependence. A deep concern resonates among American leaders
regarding the US’ dependence on foreign oil, especially since imported petroleum
crossed the 50% mark in 1998.132 Michael Klare notes, “Most policy makers
anticipated a deepening dependence on imports, and with it an ever-increasing role
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for American soldiers in guarding the global flow of oil.”133 Klare also notes that the
US foreign oil will come from unstable and unfriendly nations in dangerous areas.
Most of the remaining oil reserves are located in the Middle East, Central Asia, and
Africa, all areas that have “suffered from instability and civil unrest,” and which have
“sufficient tapped reserves to satisfy our (and the world’s) rising petroleum demand
in the years ahead.”134

The Petrodollar
The petrodollar is the second driving force to protect the US’ hegemonic
status in the world. Established at the end of World War II, in 1945 the Bretton
Woods Monetary Conference set the US dollar as the medium of exchange in an
international monetary system.135 After the war, the US saw the need for a stabilized
economy and diplomacy, a perfect vacuum for the US to fill. In addition to the
international use of the dollar, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) were established to aid the economies of Europe and Asia that were destroyed
during the war.136 Additionally, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was
established in 1949 to protect against possible Soviet Union dominance in Western
Europe, which bolstered the US’ power on the international scene. Thus the US
emerged from the post- World War II period with as a strong economic power as well
as having the largest gold reserves that allowed the US to trade and export freely with
Europe and Japan. The US experienced an enlightened age in foreign policy due to
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their strategic economic dominance, which plummeted in the late 1960’s and 1970’s
because of the expensive Vietnam War.
During the Vietnam War, European countries using the dollar, like France and
Britain, began to redeem their dollars for gold due to the fear of the floating dollar
loosing value.137 Floating currencies resulted in 1971 when the US and European
nations began to drain the Federal Reserve’s gold stocks, transferring US dollars into
gold bullion (precious metal with high economic value).138 In response, The Nixon
administration abandoned the dollar-gold link in August 1971, resulting in a system
of floating currencies to ensure not the total collapse of the gold reserves of the US.
To appease the concerns of the European nations, OPEC organized a
discussion with the G-10, or Group of Ten nations, to deliberate about a transition to
a basket of currencies.139 Wanting to preserve the international use of the US dollar,
in 1974 President Nixon arranged an agreement with Saudi Arabia, the largest oil
producing nation in the Middle East, to purchase $2.5 billion in US Treasury bills
with their oil funds, and to ensure that oil prices would be in dollars only.140 By 1975
elite US, UK banking interests, and Saudi Arabia formed an oil-backed dollar known
as petrodollar recycling, which favored US dollar hegemony.141 Petrodollar recycling
forced nations to use the dollar when buying oil. Industrial developing nations were
unable to use the US dollar that forced nations to “recycle” their petrodollars to other
nations.

137

Michael Klare, Blood and Oil, 21.
William Clarke, “The American Century: Post-World War II Period,” 18.
139
Ibid. 20.
140
Ibid. 20.
141
Ibid. 34.
138

49

The inflated price of oil due the surplus of petrodollars characterized the
1970’s. The surplus of petrodollars were given back to the US through (first), the
secret financial arrangement with SAMA (Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency) to direct
the funds to the US Federal Reserve Banks and the Bank of England, and (second),
the deposit of surplus dollars by Saudi Arabia and other OPEC producers into US/UK
banking systems. Gold reserves were transferred into dollar reserves, which became
the major reserve currency for other nations in the world.
The strength of the US dollar maintained US hegemonic power, yet
introduced a new type of strife for nations that could not survive the US interest rates
on their petrodollar loans.142 The expansion of developing nations was dependent on
oil that could only be bought in US dollars, producing large debts for newly
industrializing nations needing to export goods. The availability of oil allowed
nations to exist in the international market, yet weakened nations at the same time
because of their mounting debts that could never be paid off.143 The strategic
introduction of the dollar as the currency in which oil was to be bought and sold
maintained the US’ economic and military hegemonic power in the world.
Stated by William Clark in Petrodollar Warfare, “the Iraq War was about
dollars, euros, oil, and geostrategic power in the 21st century.”144 With respect to the
Iraq War, the debate between the US dollar and the Euro shows the last phase of the
conflict to maintain the dollar’s international standing, or an “unspoken oil-currency
war between the US and the EU.”145 The US’ military control of the remaining
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hydrocarbons and enforcement of the petrodollar arrangement shows the international
competition to be OPEC’s main currency for oil transactions, 146 as well as “to
preserve the faltering system of American economic hegemony.”147 In September
2000, Saddam Hussein announced that Iraq would use the euro currency rather than
the US dollar, a detrimental situation for the US that relies on petrodollar recycling to
fund its military supremacy. A snowball effect would occur to sell-off the already
weak dollar by foreign banks and OPEC oil producers. Responding to Hussein’s
announcement, in 2003 the US military spent $417 billion for the war in Iraq,
compared to the $120 billion spent by the EU comprised of a twelve-state union.148
Thus the US sees the Iraq War as an important strategy to maintain the US
dollar’s hegemonic force and position as a dominant power in the global economy.149
The US government’s positioning on an international level gave the administration
the agency to not be held accountable for its validity, domestically and
internationally. Through the administration’s origins as an elite culture, it was easy to
ignore the possibility of a terminal catastrophe, and thus respond with violence and
war that would guarantee the control over and access to Iraqi oil reserves in the
Middle East.150

146

William R. Clark, “The American Century: Post-World War II Period,” 27.
Ibid. 42.
148
Ibid.
149
Ibid.
150
Ibid. 41.
147

51

McWorld
The demystification of the type of markets must be addressed concerning
Benjamin R. Barber’s article from The Atlantic Monthly titled, “Jihad vs.
McWorld.”151 As his example shows, the economic strategies pursued by differing
markets calls for a critique of the Orientalist view of splitting up these two entities
represented by Jihad and McWorld into definite terms. In his article, “The Clash of
Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique,”152 Roy P. Mottahedeh contests Huntington’s
argument that “western ideas of free markets often have little resonance in Islamic
(culture).”153 Huntington’s sweeping generalization forgets the notion that many
Middle Eastern societies in the pre-Ottoman period were free market economies,
many of which still existing today, such as Morocco, Turkey, Kuwait, and most of the
other Arab Gulf states. 154 Huntington lacks empirical evidence and makes
assumptions to support his argument. Nonetheless, generalizing assumptions are
important to remember when looking at the world of Jihad and McWorld that give
insight into their perceptions. Barber uses the term, “Jihad,” not meaning its original,
Qur’anic term of “struggle,” but to invoke the notion of “[re-create] ancient
subnational and ethnic borders from within”, noting that their existence is pertinent to
the argument of the two differing economic goals in the world.
Despite Barber’s seemingly harmless notion of his term in the economic
sense, “Jihad,” it is important to notice the hidden, possibly purposeful, Orientalist
concept of the “Islamic threat.” It alludes that every single individual defined as

151

Benjamin R. Barber, “Jihad Vs. McWorld.”
Roy P. Mottahedeh, “The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist’s Critique,” 137.
153
Ibid.
154
Noam Chomsky, Failed States: The Abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy, 28.
152 152

52

“Islamic” in a religious and cultural sense agrees with the beliefs and policies of
fundamentalists and their movement. The need to identify every Muslim to determine
the Islamic threat dates back to the historical events beginning with the Crusades in
the 11th century resulting in a large generalization and grouping of all Muslims into
few categories. Fred Halliday, author of Islam & the Myth of Confrontation, argues
that the responses of the Islamic fundamentalist movement are not specific to the
Islamic ‘world’ through its complaints concerning current social and political
problems. 155
The use of Barber’s term, “McWorld,” is used to show the US’ current
economic strategy. McWorld is defined by “the onrush of economic and ecological
forces that demand integration and uniformity and that mesmerize the world . . . one
McWorld tied together by technology, ecology, communications, and commerce.”156
Economic globalism is a sub-definition of McWorld that results in homogeneity and
uniformity in methods of management as well as in the rules of market
relationships.157 McWorld’s main goal is nationalism and is achieved through four
imperatives that, in combination, are victorious over factiousness and
particularism.158
Market, resource, information-technology, and ecological imperatives
constitute McWorld’s approach to the world market. Seen through market
imperatives, multinational corporations gain speed in the West and attempt to
homogenize the world to create a healthy market despite the lack of a common
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national identity. Yet to unite the multinational corporations, a common resource is
needed, such as a language or currency, like English and the dollar. Natural resources
such as arable soil and mineral resources from less developed nations present another
form of dependence, on which developed nations depend, making them more
dependent than when they began. As a result, corporations attempt to solve these
particular, nation-specific problems through Americanized universal solutions with
the use of information-technology imperatives for generalizing the technology’s
needs. Globalization and universalism do not solve the ecological imperative that
creates a greater inequality between nations of differing status. The US’ economic
position is portrayed through the image of McWorld that clashes with many other
types of nations and economies characterized with the image of the world of “Jihad.”
The “religion of the market,” adopted by A. Rodney Dobell, is an acceptance
of an individualistic religion of economics and of markets, using Nature as an
everlasting supply of resources to gain admission into the dominant, global market.159
Under this economic religion, individual and social incentives succeeded to the point
of boosting rapid growth of per capita incomes, foreshadowing future possible
increased incomes that are well received around the world.160 Environmental
wastefulness, destructive technologies for harvesting renewable resources, and
extraction of exhaustible resources results as a nation attempts to become a part of the
world of McWorld. Western nations constitute the majority of devotees to the
“religion of the market.”
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Driven by possible economic advantages of more oil to drive production, such
as cheaper gas prices, a healthier market, and an overall increase in gross domestic
profit (GDP), nations ignore the ecological downfalls of their actions, and continue
the cycle of consumption, dependence, and wastefulness. McWorld is driven by the
force to unite all nations under the global neoliberal economic regime, which only
serves the West’s hunger for power leads to dwindling amounts of oil. William
Clarke supports this notion concerning the US and oil, stating that evidence for the
Bush administration’s apprehension of losing their dominant international position is
found in the actions it has taken to maintain the US’s position of military superiority
and to control the global economic system with the dollar. The increase in national
security, whether by bolstering military action or strengthening an internal profit, is a
product of vulnerability.161
The McWorld image portrays the American definition and location of the holy
as the global power and control of natural resources. From the Western perspective,
the hegemonic power, yielded across the globe, is the American definition of the
holy, based on the first chapter’s definition that the holy is “present wherever
fundamental questions of what is ultimately powerful and worthy in life.”162
America’s neoconservative movement in the later half of the 20th century asks the
same moral questions, disputing what is classified as “holy” and requesting social
change for the correct path of American. A look at the neoconservative movement
will follow, along with a discussion of Leo Strauss and his “natural right.”
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Neoconservativism and Leo Strauss
Neoconservatism
Since 1930’s and 1940’s, neoconservatism has existed in response to the
expansionist and totalitarian state of communism.163 Irving Kristol defines a
neoconservative as, “A liberal ‘mugged by reality,”164 neoconservative views were
present in New York intellectual circles with individuals such as Sidney Hook, Irving
Kristol, and Norman Podhoretz.165 The presidential era of Lyndon Johnson in the
1960’s represents the beginning of the neoconservative presence in the White House
with the influential roles of late Democrats Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota or Henry
Jackson of Washington. The US opposed the Manichean struggle with the Soviet
Union “to play an important role in improving life and protecting the cultural
freedom of all citizens at home,”166 and “to extend America’s unrivaled global
dominance and to complete the transformation of American conservatism.”167 In the
late 1960’s, neoconservatism represented a reaction to the 1960’s counter-culture,
known as McGovernism. The term came from the rise of George McGovern in 1972,
who defeated former Vice-President Hubert Humphrey for the Democratic
presidential nomination.168 McGovernism saw America’s international involvement
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as “immoral, imperialistic, and corrupting,”169 standing for “appeasement and the
politics of liberal guilt, while the neocons stood for a self-confident and militantly
interventionist Americanism.”170 A discussion of the neoconservative movement’s
most influential member, Leo Strauss, will be discussed in relation to the movement’s
presence in American foreign policy.

Leo Strauss and the “Natural Right”
Leo Strauss was a political philosopher in the 20th century who taught political
science at the University of Chicago, published 15 books, and taught several
generation of students. His term, the “natural right,” is noteworthy for the discussion
of modernity and “the entailed crisis of the West that is manifest in the crisis of
liberal democracy.”171
Strauss’s essay, “Political Philosophy and the Crisis of our Time,” explains
his views about 20th century society. Other than the threat of communism, the basic
threat is the “internal disability of modern liberal democracy,”172 where the West has
lost its purpose and faith and needs to return to their “natural right,” as described
later. The regime of the modern liberal democracy is a limited government with
public and private sectors, “which in effect means the private (and secret) is above
(below, or outside) the law and outside the realm of political responsibility in the
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classical sense.”173 These ideas are reduced to an ideology where Strauss notes the
importance of its origins and interpretations as equaling as the ideology itself.174
Strauss wrote Natural Rights and History that outlines the principles, “to
argue for a return to truth, to a standard common to all and grounded in nature.”175
Nature was of the unknown and not of certainty, which “might be known but wasn’t,
of that which might be known but as not yet.”176 It is also split into the natural and
unnatural, approached by “a pure and whole questioning.”177 The term, “natural
right,” expresses a subtle nuance compared to “natural law” that Strauss could have
used. “Natural right” gives room for interpretation and does not delineate an absolute
path that “natural law” communicates. “Natural law threatens the political order by
setting up a moral law that transcends the political order.”178 Additionally, natural law
subordinates the “prudent statesmen,” forbidding certain actions that would protect
the state. “Its otherwordly nature places a great strain upon the political order because
it makes absolute demands on it that are oblivious to its limitations.”179
Strauss’s notion of the “natural right” is important for the discussion of
modernity and democracy. Strauss explains the “natural right” as “the right of the
wise to rule absolutely or in the absence of law Strauss understands tyranny (as it is
commonly understood) to be the rule in the absence of law. Classic natural right is,
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therefore, identical with the tyranny of the wise.”180 Strauss bases much of his
“natural right” theory from Aristotle that practical wisdom of the wise is better than a
set of rules, or “provides man with principles of conduct, but with a hierarchy of
ends.”181 These needs, such as peace, stability, and preservation are hierarchically
lower than justice and takes precedence in order to ensure the livelihood of the higher
institution. “Justice may have to be sacrificed for the sake of the public safety, and
such sacrifices are also in accordance with the requirement of natural right . . .
Without the preservation of the city, the life of the philosopher would be
impossible.”182 In the name of the natural right, there are no limits, similar to the
Machiavellian view that extreme situations allow for the suspension of natural justice
for the preservation of the state. To conclude Strauss’ “natural right” theory, the
following quote expresses the views of the neoconservatives in the Washington.
Classic natural right maintains the primacy or priority of the good over
the right or just. The good is understand as the end to which all action is a
means; it is a state of affairs deemed desirable, excellent, noble, or worthy
of pursuit of its own sake . . . Right is therefore subordinate to good.183
Authority in the 20th century has accepted Strauss’s political philosophy too
often and without needed critical thought.184 The neoconservative position accepts
Strauss’s “deprecation of morality”185 and overlooks justice in the name of security.
The natural right becomes the fundamental question that nature authorizes
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totalitarianism in every aspect of life and allows for US’ interventionist approach to
politics and economics.186

Neoconservatism in the White House
The neoconservative movement began as a reality in response to
“communism-as-evil, the centrality of military force, and the indispensability of the
American idea and much else.”187 The election of President Ronald Reagan
articulated the neoconservative stance on foreign policy with the election of thirteen
neocons to high-ranking positions in the Republican administration. “Neocons
provided the intellectual ballast for Reagan’s military build-up and his anticommunist
foreign policy . . . They argued that a massive military build-up was necessary and the
U.S. needed to ‘take the right to the Soviets.’”188
The neoconservative doctrine of totalitarianism supported the US foreign policy as a
faith. According to the doctrine, during the Cold War the world experienced an
ideological struggle between ‘good and evil’, or the US and the Soviet Union. The
Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations left continued this legacy regarding their
edicts to fight communism and to aid nations that threatened the US’ role of
dominance.189 However, the neoconservative’s totalitarian faith was contradicted with
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 and the election of President George H.W.
Bush who opposed certain neoconservative viewpoints. As a result, few positions
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were given to neoconservatives, while keeping yet kept the idea to “create an
American-dominated world order.”190
“Pax Americana” became the new order for American foreign policy in 1992
in order to put down the US’ remaining rivals and enemies to ensure the US’ total
control. Paul Wolfowitz, a neocon from Reagan’s administration, supported the idea
of global control in the Bush I administration, and was supported by Bush’s Secretary
of Defense, Dick Cheney, a old-style conservative, yet also an ally with many
neoconservatives. The first Bush administration did not give the neoconservatives
enough sustaining power, which eventually lead to their fallout with the
administration.
The Clinton administration behaved similarly, clashing with the
neoconservative’s ideas on foreign policy concerning the level and control of
American’s hegemonic power. Interesting to note is the change in the meaning of
strength for a nation that resulted in the 1990’s represented in the Clinton
administration. Before and during the Cold War, a nation’s strength was based on its
military power and its alliance system that proved that one’s nation could stand alone
in a turbulent world society. Yet the end of the Cold war heralded in a new definition
of a nation’s power, one that emphasized its economic dynamism and the cultivation
of technological innovation.191 According to the Institute for National Security
Studies, “national security depends on successful engagement in the global
economy.”192 A resilient and powerful domestic economy meant that a nation could
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compete with other nations to develop and export high-tech goods, which turned into
the characterizing feature of what a powerful nation meant. In 1993, President Bill
Clinton articulated the need for an “econocentric” approach to national security,
which was executed initially through expansion of international trade in Latin
American and Asia and investment in his foreign policy goals.193 By linking
economic interests with security interests, it was only a matter of time that the push
for a protection of oil was enforced due to its importance to both interests. Thus,
military enforcement to guarantee its security was implemented in order to continue
the economic growth and production needed to compete on the international market.
The election of George W. Bush in 2000 represented a second chance for the
neoconservatives to put unipolarists and realists in high-ranking positions. A global
empire strategy was emphasized outlined in a PNAC (Project for the New American
Century) position paper stating issues regarding defense systems, defense spending,
defense allocation, and the reinvention of the U.S. military. In 2001, the attacks of
September 11 provided the perfect excuse for the administration’s hopes. “The
neocon fantasy of military expansion, preemptive warfare, and regime-changing
unilateralism became American policy.”194 The Bush administration was concerned
with overthrowing Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and knew that an Islamist multinational
extremist Sunni movement, Al-Qaeda, could blamed as the perfect scapegoat during
the turbulent period after September 11. “It didn’t matter if Iraq had nothing to do
with September 11; what mattered was getting rid of Saddam and imposing a pro-
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American regime in the middle of the Middle East.”195 Additionally, “Bush officials
wanted to change the Middle East, creating a pro-American Iraq that gave the U.S. a
direct power base, ensured the oil supply, set off a chain-reaction of regime changes,
gave relief to Israel, and got rid of a thuggish enemy.”196 The US government uses the
popular reason of conducting the “war on terror” to explain its involvement in the
Middle East and downplays its true reasons for the Western cravings for global
empire superiority, the supreme security of resources, and the power of the dollar.
The government’s real task and aim is protection of its interests, usually represented
as “noble intent and self-defense” in place of geopolitical or strategic objectives in the
Middle East.197
As stated by leftist commentator and blogger Matthew Yglesias,
neoconservatives “‘believe that America should coercively dominate the world
through military force’ and ‘believe in a dogmatic form of American exceptionalism’
and ‘favor the creation of a U.S.- dominated ‘universal empire.’”198

Doctrines supporting the US’ hegemonic power
Universality
The hegemonic power of the US rejects universality, the idea that every nation
is held accountable to the same standard regarding political, economic, and social
rights. Beginning in 1945, the United Nations entrusted the US to end the second
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world war and gave the US the title of “the supreme law of the land.”199 However,
according to Noam Chomsky, this principle “is flatly rejected in the elite intellectual,
moral, and political culture of the most powerful states,”200 and is often ignored and
excluded from public discourse. US’ policies on environment degradation and foreign
affairs exemplify the US’ denial of universal laws that supports the US’ idea of
militaristic superiority.
The Group of Eight summit of 2005 in Gleneagles, Scotland shows the Bush
administration’s neglect of responsibility pertaining to the global warming crisis. The
summit’s goal was to bring the rich countries together in order to discuss and
implement urgent action concerning cost-effective techniques to reduce net global
greenhouse gas emissions. The Bush administration did not respond properly to the
growing concerns of human impact on global warming, nor did it acknowledge that
the US had a part to play in the environmental issue.201 The Bush administration
doubted the validity of the summit’s argument due to the fact that we “do not know
enough about this literally world-changing phenomenon,” and that global warming is
“too uncertain a matter to justify anything more than voluntary measures.”202
The Bush administration acted similarly in 2005 at an annual meeting of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science. The meeting concluded to
have found “the most compelling evidence yet” to support the need of humanity to
take responsibility for their ecological footprint. The meeting received little attention
in the US media despite its correlation to the Kyoto protocols, which the Bush
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administration rejected even with supporting evidence from highly recognized and
revered researchers. This dismissal of universality and disregard for the world’s
environmental stability shows the US’ rejection of the world’s acknowledgments
concern for the security of the world. The US cannot forget that it plays a significant
role in destroying the environment through its production and unstoppable
consumption of oil. Ignoring its significantly harmful role in environmental pollution
and consumption is unforgivable, which emphasizes their global universality.
In 2004, Bush’s policies concerning the use of force show the US’ rejection of
universality concerning foreign policy. A report in 2004 by the UN High-level Panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change states that “force can be lawfully deployed only
when authorized by the Security Council, or under Article 51”, which gives the “right
of individual or collective self-defense if armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations.”203 Article 51 is interpreted as the justification for self-defense
and gives no restrictions or reinterpretations. The UN World Summit in September
2005 endorsed the provisions of the Charter, neglecting to grant other individual
states or regional alliances the same type of treatment. Bush’s doctrine of
“anticipatory self-defense” highlights the Western-centric and elite perception of “the
right of the United States to attack a county that it thinks could attack it first,”204
stated by Condoleezza Rice. Condoleezza Rice also supported the US’ unilateral right
on numerous occasions, stating that the US does not need to “conform” to
international behavior or international agreements, unlike the rest of the nations and
allies.
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Finally, the justifications for the Iraqi war symbolize the US’ rejection of
universality. The US did not see itself as being held to the same accountability as
other nations when it declared war on Iraq. The US clasped onto its militaristic
domination and saw itself in a higher position and status compared to other nations in
the world regarding its military power and responsibility. Foreign policy documents
and studies on the Bush administration have surfaced that demonstrate the US’
aspiration for geostrategic dominance and prohibition of other nations to compete
with US domination.205
For example, the major policy study in March 1992 by the Project for a New
American Century (PNAC) titled, “Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategies,
Forces and Resources for a New Century,” emphasized the neoconservative view of
US dominance, stating “no other nations will be allowed to ‘challenge’ US
hegemony.”206

Promotion of Democracy
Iraq was also justified by Bush’s doctrine of “promoting democracy abroad.”
This doctrine “has been a primary goal of US foreign policy ever since Woodrow
Wilson endowed it with a ‘powerful idealist element.’”207 According to Raja Bahlul,
the democratic West claims that democracy “is the only morally defensible political
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order, the only political option for societies and states that do not want to be left
behind in the rapidly evolving world in which we live.”208
Bush’s messianic message of bringing democracy to the Middle East
expresses this hopeful tone of an idealistic war.209 Thomas Carothers, the director of
the Democracy and Rule of Law Project, is a witness to Bush’s mission. “American
exceptionalism” gives reason and meaning to the doctrine, creating misimpressions
about itself and its enemies to ensure that the correct interests receive the most power.
“‘Preemptive’ state terror”210 further separates nations from each other, dividing them
into “failed states” or “outlaw states”.
The US’ fear of independent nationalism goes to “impressive lengths”211 to
remain the ‘masters of the hemisphere.’ Historical ties with Cuba, Iran, and Syria
exemplify the US’ fear of rebelliousness and the possibility of the nation’s
exponential growth without the help of the US. These doctrines of the ‘rogue’ nations
would spill into other nations, “corrupting” their governments and creating a larger
force against the “unquestioned power” of the US.212
The strategic military response to remove of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) became the justification for the Iraqi War to mask the US’ hegemonic
foreign policy.213 By ensuring the removal the WMD from a country that the US
feared could interrupt their influence over resources, mainly oil, the Bush
administration gained support from congress to wage war in Iraq. Bush’s vision of
208
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democracy soon followed, tailing behind the need to remove a harmful power ruled
by a dictator and replace it with a democracy. According to Richard U. Ullman’s
article, “Redefining Security,” the US government focused energy towards the easier
depiction of an ideology of military dangers for the inattentive public rather than
Washington’s true interests. With the war in Iraq, no WMD’s were found despite the
Bush administration persuasive arguments to the public. Deception by the
government went so far as to distort, manipulate, and ignore actual intelligence under
false pretenses in order to gain the support of the nation to invade Iraq.214 The
reasoning for the US presence in Iraq was modified to bring democracy to the Middle
East and according to Augustus Richard Norton, jumped onto the “democratization
bandwagon.”215 Articulated by Noam Chomsky, “So understood, ‘promotion of
democracy is central’ to Bush strategy in a kind of postmodern interpretation, in
which we restrict attention to narrative and text, recoiling from “Truth,” perhaps a
social construction.”216

An image for a hidden agenda
The support of the badly uninformed American public is inadvertently the
most powerful tool for the US’ foreign policies, allowing for “a rational planning to
promote dominant domestic interests.”217 The US government is able manipulate its
own power because of the public’s ignorance and unawareness concerning foreign
issues, allowing evidence to be misconstrued and falsified in order to support their

214

Noam Chomsky, Failed States: the abuse of power and the assault on democracy, 25.
Ibid. 130.
216
Ibid. 159.
217
Ibid. 110.
215

68

own interests of geopolitical strategic power. Demonic messianism of the ‘enemy’ is
the result, a perceptions captured by the US government and supported by the
influence of American popular culture.218
The ‘veil of deceit’ originates during the Cold War beginning with the
Truman Doctrine to portray the Soviet’s as a diabolic being that must be stopped by
any means necessary. During the Reagan era, the Soviets were the focus of evil in the
modern world in contrast to the US,219 seen as an “evil empire.”220 Samuel
Huntington expressed similar views in 1981 focusing on the need to create an image
of the Soviet threat to ensure the conflict’s acceptance by the public and media. “
‘You may have to sell’ intervention or other military action ‘in such a way as to
create the impression that it is the Soviet Union that you are fighting.”221 At the same
time, the “war on drugs” in Latin America “served to frighten the domestic
population into obedience”222 and was to ensure the public’s total submission to the
huge government-media propaganda campaign.
With the fabrication of a demonic enemy, a savior or messiah was conjured to
protect the US public, a vacuum that US politicians and powerful policies agreeably
filled.223 “Demonic messianism is a natural device for leadership groups that are at
the extreme of the spectrum in their dedication to the short-term interests of narrow
sectors of power and wealth, and to global domination.”224 Politicians portray
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themselves as rescuing the public from a nightmare of international terrorism, an
illusion they created themselves. Due to the public’s lack of knowledge, the fashioned
terror encourages the battle between good and evil, a fear that is essential to the
neoconservative movement for world hegemonic dominance.225
In Bernard Lewis’ article in 1991 titled, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” the
Soviet threat is transformed into the Muslim threat, capitalizing equally on the
obliviousness of the US public. The initial battle between good and evil was a war
that was never suppose to end, its goals largely misconstrued in order to maintain the
US’ dominate world status, and perpetuated with the “war on terror” with Arab
nations. With the fall of the Soviet Union after the war in Afghanistan, the US-allied
Arab warriors, known as the “Afghan Arabs,” became the new threat to US interests
in the Middle East. The Afghan jihadists, lead and financed by Osama bin Laden,
became the new targets of the US against terrorism, which will be discussed further in
Chapter 3. Saddam Hussein in Iraq became equally menacing for the US due to his
growing power in the Gulf that could undermine the US’ oil and power interests.
Images of “Great Satans” were invoked to further the menacing image.226 The US
became dedicated to defending the world for an “inspiring vision” against the polar
opposite of the “Great Satan”.227
The US created a “phantom enemy” to mask its true interests in Gulf Region’s
natural resources, “a fantasy serving the interests of many.”228 Providing an ideology
of a tangible phenomenon, the US gained the needed support in order to engage in
225
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Middle Eastern conflicts that would ensure the protection and security of the flow of
power and resources.

Conclusion
The US’ hunger for total domination and control of resources are the most
formidable of its ideological weapons.229 The US is the corporeal reality of Barker’s
McWorld that masks its true nature at any cost and ruled by its hunger for
consumption and power guided by the “religion of the market.” However, with the
existence of US’ worldly status, another force is developed to counter the strength of
the US and its policies: Islamic fundamentalism.
The following chapter will discuss the Islamic response to the changing world
instigated by the US and its consequences on the world. Conflict does not result in
response to differing civilizations, as highlighted in chapter one, yet is produced from
the growing tensions surrounding the security and protection of resources. Political
Islam’s response to the modernizing world is often correlated and mistaken for a
response to differing religious beliefs, when religious justifications are used for the
removal of imperial powers from their lands and its resources.
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Chapter 3: The Response to Modernization
from the Muslim Perspective
Introduction
From the radical, sometimes termed fundamentalist, Muslim perspective, the
world is in a state of jahiliyyah, or a state “characterized by ignorance of the divine
truth”230 that opposes the Islamic constitution, state, and laws.231 According to John
Esposito explaining the Muslim perception of conditions of the world, the world is
dominated by “corrupt authoritarian governments and a wealthy elite concerned more
in economic prosperity rather than natural development.”232 These effects result from
the influence of Western, European colonialism beginning in the 18th century. As a
result, a radicalized Muslim minority combines militancy with messianic visions to
inspire “an army of God whose jihad they believe will liberate Muslims at home and
abroad.”233
Islam is used to legitimize the complaints of the world’s current political state
that resulted from the effects from Western culture and life. Islamic fundamentalism
designates Islam to provide solutions to the world’s problems that Muslim societies
are facing today.234 The Qur’an designates Islam’s place in the world through da’wa
as “God’s ‘call’ to human society to find in Islam the true religion,” in Qur’an
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(14:46). 235 Islamic fundamentalists become the vanguards to ensure that the world’s
current pace of change will not wipe out their culture and tradition from the seventh
century.236 This Islamic imperative is often misconstrued for fanaticism and
intolerance due to the world’s media237 that often advertises individuals that are on
the “radical fringe of a broad-based Islamic jihad.”238 The perceived images of
Islamic fundamentalists and jihad result from Islam’s power and idealistic concept
that transforms into the primary idiom of Muslim politics into a created perception by
“rulers and the ruled, be reformers, political opposition, and terrorists.”239 The
following chapter will look at two prominent thinkers that have contributed to Islamic
fundamentalism, Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb. The ideologies of the
two individuals are framed around Western European colonialism that calls for a
ridding of alien influence in the ummah, or the community or nation. A radicalized
form of Islam uses the call to jihad to bolster and legitimize the rejection of Western
influence. Following the discussion of the influence of Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab
and Sayyid Qutb, Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda will be looked at to discern the
impact of past thinkers influenced by colonial powers.

235

Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori. Muslim Politics. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1996), 35.
236
Ankbar S. Ahmed, Donnan, Hastings. “Islam in the Age of Postmodernity.” In Islam, Globalization,
and Postmodernity. (London: Routledge, 1994), 13.
237
Ibid. 14
238
John Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam, 73.
239
Ibid.

73

Gramscian approach
When looking at the responses of Islamic fundamentalism, the Gramscian
approach is used as a form of methodology to understand the ideas and processes that
fundamentalist Islam employs. Antonio Gramsci was an Italian theorist in writing at
beginning of the 20th century who contributed to the Marxist critique of hegemony.
The theory states “that man is not ruled by force alone, but also by ideas,” and that it
is “political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured by
the diffusion and popularization of the world view of the ruling class.”240 In Thomas
J. Butko’s article, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the rise of
Political Islam,” political Islam is framed according to the blending of Islamic ethic
and Gramscian theory, outlining the countering force of political Islam as a response
to the ‘passivity of the Islamic state,’ 241 which responds to the Western, hegemonic
powers who see the shari’a and Islamic way of life as problematic.
Political Islam, or Islamic fundamentalism as it is known in the West, is the
counter to a hegemonic force “with the sole and ultimate objective of overthrowing
the current elites and the present political, economic, and social structure.”242 With
the establishment of a viable revolutionary force, or a “political organization erected
upon religious foundations,”243 which eradicates the old form of rule creating a
political vacuum, an expected new form of society will result, “a new morality and,
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most fundamentally, a new type of man.”244 An alternative to this hegemon will allow
for a new way of thinking and the success of a revolution. The forms and problems
that an individual faces when attempting to bring about a change through political
Islam, or his “true consciousness,” will be discussed, looking at the power and
legitimacy of the elites in their sociopolitical order.
The elite’s view of “common sense” poses the problematic issue of forcing its
conception of the world onto the masses, which prevents them from realizing their
“true consciousness.” Human nature is open to influences by dominant forces of
society and thus can be compliant to new ideas or beliefs. The elites, or the most
educated members of society, “will determine the general orientation and beliefs of
the masses,”245 which, through the breakdown of this elite power, can be transported
to the revolutionary movement. The state, and thus the elite power, is made up of
political society and civil society, which exists as their “armour of coercion.”246
However, if the support civil society is gained, the attempt to control state
power can be accomplished. The support of civil society is gained through the
understanding of the “collective man,” or the formation of a larger group with similar
aims and goals as an ideology. “Shared perceptions of repression, exclusion, and
marginalization,”247 as well as the “[search] for greater meaning in life, brought about
by increased feelings of ‘spiritual inadequacy,” unite the common man, rather than
the Marxist’s reason due to economics. The ideology of the ruling class, or the
structure, is in tern more important for the hegemon’s supremacy in a society. With
244

Thomas J. Butko, “Revelation or Revolution: A Gramscian Approach to the Rise of Political
Islam,” 42.
245
Ibid. 44.
246
Ibid. 45.
247
Ibid.

75

this understanding, instruction and education must be invoked for supporters of the
counter-hegemonic force, “while exposing the ‘evilness’ of the regime and the
surrounding jahiliyyah society.”248
According to Gramsci, this counter-hegemonic force is made up of three
pieces: a coherent and attractive ideology, a political organization expressing that
ideology, and a well-developed strategy. An ideology is an instrument for unifying
the masses of divergent interests, usually through “their opposition to the current
elites and desire for its overthrow.”249 It also must provide an alternative to the
conception of the world, as well as an answer to the problems faced by a society.
An organizational structure is the “concrete expression” of the ideology’s
goal, made up of three types of groups: the leadership, the vanguard, and the
individual members. The type and level of leadership determines the cohesiveness
and potential success of the movement, seen with leaders such as Hassan al-Banna
(1906-1949), Khomeini (1902-1989), and Mawdudi (1903-1979). The vanguard, or
the inner circle of individuals, is “a group of the most dedicated and active members,
on whom could be placed the primary burden of serving God and the message.”250
Sayyid Qutb, a 20th century Egyptian Islamic revolutionary, refers to the necessity
and importance of a vanguard during the march against the jahiliyyah in his book,
Milestones, in which the vanguard ensures the confrontation and possible destruction
of the jahiliyyah society. Gramsci stresses the individual members, or the mass, and
believes in the “inherent value of each and every individual by declaring that since
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‘all men are philosophers’, they should be considered ‘intellectuals’ in the grander
sense.”251 Individual self-dedication and discipline, like the five daily prayers, make
up Islam, while faith and firm conviction ensure the success of the aims of the
movement. “Hence, if the seed (Islam) is planted and creates strong roots of
leadership, the branches and its leaves (individual members) cannot avoid being
nourished and, thus, spreading the word and message of Islam throughout the entire
world.” 252
Finally, a well-developed strategy is needed, which Gramsci names as the
‘war of position,’ as “to infiltrate civil society through the dissemination of new ideas
and, in the process, to intellectually and culturally prepare the ground for the
revolutionary movement’s assault on hegemonic dominance.”253 A re-education in the
core principles of Islam has been the cornerstone to the 20th century Islamic
movement since Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood In Egypt,
and comprises the strategy of the ‘war of position.’ Qutb agrees with this type of
strategy, stating, “Our aim is to first change ourselves so that we may later change the
society.”254 Muslim societies are equally capable of committing acts similar to the
jahiliyyah society, thus require equal energy in the reeducation.
The confrontation of opposites will ensure the movement’s success to counter
the present power in the world, first to separate and then eventually to completely
destroy. “Consequently, the aim of this movement must be to consciously separate
itself from the current social order, while simultaneously attempting to destroy it
251
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entirely.”255 This separation also includes a rejection of the hegemonic ways and
power, followed by the total adoption of the counter-hegemonic forces. Values are
“rewritten” within the Muslim culture, “participating in a complex process of
reconciliation which actually extends the boundaries of modernization rather than
causing it to stay or preventing its progress.”256 Through the achievement of political
power in all of the movement’s methods, political Islam will bring about a
fundamental change in the sociopolitical sphere.
The following section will look at two prominent thinkers who have had a
substantial influence on the current Islamic fundamentalist movement, Muhammad
Abd Ibn al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb. From these perspectives, the Muslim response
was aimed at European colonialism beginning in the 18th century and the failure of
modern Muslim states, which hastened the debate of the meaning of jihad.257 By
delving into the Gramscian theory that explains Islamic fundamentalism, one can
understand the ways in which a movement is established. To oppose the “ruling”
hegemonic force that imposes their conception of the world, a counter-hegemonic
force is realized as “a demand for the present and a hope for the future,”258
accomplished through an ideology, political organization, and strategy.
Al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb played crucial roles in the development of the
Islamic fundamentalist mindset through their use of religion to justify their response
to European colonialism. As discussed later in the chapter, Osama bin Laden
contends that promotion of the education of Islam is vital for all Muslims in order to
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realize the jihad against the aggressive US government and its policies259. In the
context of discussing Afghanistan, bin Laden notes:
So we advise Muslims both within and outside Afghanistan to help these
students [the Taliban’s subjects in Afghanistan], and we advise Muslims
outside [Afghanistan] that much of the effort that is being made is doing
hardly anything to promote the existence of a state of Islam . . . And we
call on Muslims to help this state [Afghanistan] with all their might, their
ideas, their charitable donations and funds, for which God’s will it represents
the banner of Islam today.260
According to bin Laden, a jihad is used in self defense, and is the only way to obtain
a faithful strength to unite Islam against the enemy.261 In an interview between AlJazeera and bin Laden in 1998, bin Laden stated that the call to jihad needs to occur
now, contrary to many scholars who believe “now is not the time.”262 All individuals
from the Muslim world are “obliged to strive” for a jihad to rid the ummah of
unfavorable powers. The example of bin Laden is used to show the evolution and
progression of Islamic fundamentalism in the 21st century from the teachings of alWahhab and Sayyid Qutb. Both thinkers emphasized the rejection of Western
influence, which interferes with the education and proselytization of Islam in a world
that is supposedly in a state of jahiliyyah. The term will be used to refer to the world
that these two thinkers wish to change, mirroring the ideal version of an Islamic
world.
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Jahiliyyah
The question of faith between the divine and the human, or din, characterizes
Islam’s jahiliyyah.263 The first evidence of jahiliyyah is in pre-Islamic, pagan Arabia
and found in pagan poetry. “Jahiliyyah is not lack of knowledge on the part of the
jahili poet or on the part of his jahili masters, but simply disobedience to God’s law
and order. These jahili poets worshipped idols and not Allah, thus not following
God’s order.”264 Pagan scholars and poets are seen as committing jahiliyyah who do
not fully submit to Allah.
With the birth of Islam and the Qur’an in the seventh century, individuals not
following God’s orders are seen as disbelievers, using a variation of the term
jahiliyyah, such as jahil for individuals, and jahilun and juhhal for them as a group.265
Jahiliyyah took on its own meaning in the Qur’an as a result of the Qur’an’s usage of
the word from the pre-Islamic period. The term is to denote a contrast to Islam, seen
in Qur’an 39:63-64 with, “Say [O Muhammad}: Is it some one other than Allah that
you order me to worship, oh jahilun ones?’”266 Thus, “the term was a religio-political
concept used oppositionally to the Islamic constitution, state, and laws.”267

Wahhabism
Origins of Wahhabism
Today, Wahhabi Islam is known because of its Saudi origins and affiliation
with the bin Laden family. Initially known as the Wahhabiyya, or Wahhabism by the
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West, it exists as an 18th century Islamic revivalism “that [sought] to purify Islam of
any innovations or practices that deviate from the seventh century teachings of
Prophet Muhammad and his companions.” 268 According to the Encyclopedia of Islam
and the Muslim World, Wahhabism was “the last significant reformist effort in the
area before European imperialism.”269 It holds puritanical and iconoclastic
philosophies forbidding saint veneration, the celebration of the Prophet’s birthday,
some mystical teachings of Sufism, and the loathing for music.270 These bans often
clash with many of Islam’s other non-Wahhabi sects, like Sunni Muslims, Shiite
Muslims, and non-Muslim neighbors that participate in shrine veneration. According
to John Esposito, Wahhabism today “continues to be a significance force in the
Islamic world, informing both maintstream and extremist movements from Africa and
Central Asia to Europe and America.”271 A discussion of the Wahhabi movement’s
origins will follow, first by looking at its founder’s theoretical positions for its
justifications and ending with the movement’s historical context until the present day.
Wahhabism’s origins can be traced to an 18th century thinker named
Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1971) from Najd in the Arabian Peninsula.
Al-Wahhab held strict convictions that differed from mainstream Islam,
“disillusioned by the spiritual decline and moral laxity of his society.”272 He called for
“a return to tawhid” (strict monotheism) and viewed society as moving away from the
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pure Islam he called for.273 He also called for a fresh interpretation of Islam that
returned to its revealed sources, seen through the Qur’an and hadith.274 Muslims
should read the Qur’an for their own interpretation and disregard other human
insights into the interpretation of scripture. Similarly as regards the hadith, its content
must be analyzed by the individual rather than using the interpretations of
transmitters. Literature by hadith commentators made it difficult to see the difference
between the actual story and the commentary of the authors.275 According to alWahhab, through the study of the Qur’an and hadith, contextualization and the search
for purpose are the proper ways to understand Islam, rather than just with
memorization and analysis of other interpretations.276 Al-Wahhab’s book titled, Kitab
al-Tawhid, or the Book of Monotheism, outlined his basic teachings and describes the
themes of his work with the Qur’an and hadith.
In Kitab al-Tawhid, an entire treatise is dedicated to tawhid, which al-Wahhab
describes as the sole characteristic of Islam “reflected in the Wahhabi’s selfdesignation as ‘unitarians.’”277 The treatise attributes Christianity and Judaism’s false
monotheism to their “ordained clergy, papacy, or binding interpretations of scripture
written by rabbis or priests.”278 Kitab al-Tawhid represents al-Wahhab’s manifesto
for action and a justification for fighting those with different beliefs.279 The idea of
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tawhid “makes it clear that correct belief is intended to lead to correct behavior,”280
since knowingly violating tawhid is a greater sin than unknowingly.
The Wahhabis are known for their clear definitions of faith (Iman) and
unbelief, or kufr, which is “any failure to follow the teachings of the Wahhabis.” AlWahhab teaches that non-Muslim individuals must be educated on the Islamic way of
life, and will be excused from ignorance.281 He agrees that faith “cannot exist without
proper instruction in the Qur’an and Sunna,” 282 To aid this practice, al-Wahhab
taught that guiding individuals to Islam is the most worthy action a Muslim can do
through the infusion of knowledge and education through proselytization.283 This
education occurs through steps, beginning with the acceptance of tawhid284(the
monotheistic belief in Allah). The opposite of tawhid, shirk, is taught as “a violation
of and departure from tawhid,” and assigns power and sovereignty “to someone or
something other than God,” which was the greatest sin of all according to alWahhab.285 According to the Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, AlWahhab’s teachings “provided the ideological basis for the militant conquest of the
Arabian peninsula that had been undertaken by the Sa’ud family.”286
In addition to the impacts of al-Wahhab’s work on the current Islamic
fundamentalist movement, the evolved Wahhabi appeal seen in Saudi Arabia adds to
the discussion of the Islamic fundamentalist origins. The development of the Wahhabi
movement in Saudi Arabia is notable due to its deeply intertwined status with the
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politics of the kingdom, turning into a religio-political movement.287 The Arab clan of
Al-Saud was the Wahhabi rival in the region, which eventually joined forces in 1745.
Through the formation of the al-Wahhab-Saudi alliance, “Ibn Sa’ud pledged to give
military support for the propagation and enforcement of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s
teachings,” 288 elevating Wahhabism to a sizeable position in the kingdom. The 18th
century alliance represented the symbiotic relationship of the two powers in Saudi
Arabia, which Ibn Saud employed Wahhabism “as a religious ideal to legitimate his
jihad to subdue and unite the tribes of Arabia, converting them to this puritanical
version of Islam.”289
While attempting to establish power in the region in the 18th century, Western
imperial powers, like the British, capitalized on this strong alliance due to its
resistance against the Ottoman Empire for the availability and protection of its
resource interests in the Arabian Peninsula. In conjunction with imperial powers, the
ultimate goals of the al-Wahhab and Ibn Sa’ud alliance, was to “undermine the
Ottomans, subdue the Two Holy Places, and impose the Wahhabi dispensation on the
entire ummah.”290 As a result, the Saudi ruling class formed a commanding,
influential, and wealthy elite that “legitimated its domestic and foreign policies by
claiming to govern and be governed by the Qur’an and sharia.”291
Until Saudi Arabia’s founding in 1932, the region was constantly in conflict
with foreign powers and influences, like the Ottoman Empire and Britain. First, in the
early 19th century, the Ottoman sultan permitted the governor of Egypt, Muhammad
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‘Ali (1769-1849), to destroy the Wahhabi state by the Ottoman sultan, which was
later revoked in 1822.292 Second, in the 20th century during the First World War, the
British curtailed the Wahhabi expansion in Arabia, which was revoked later in 1925,
regardless of their previous cordial relationship.293
In response, the Wahhabi movement contributed a totalitarian system based
on the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood), which established its
own form of fascism “based on a monopoly of wealth by the elite, backed by extreme
repression and a taste for bloodshed.”294 The Ikhwan’s doctrine called for a rejection
of non-Qur’anic or non-Wahhabi texts and music, alongside a skeptical view of
modern technology. Nonetheless, with the discovery of oil in 1938, the Wahhabis and
the Saud family became “the world’s richest and most powerful ruling elite,”295 as
well as initiating the clash “between the Sa’audi family and clerical establishment and
the most zealous Wahhabi loyalists.”296
Further foreign presence occurred in Saudi Arabia in 1945 with the Roosevelt-Ibn Sa’ud alliance on the USS Quincy, with the US’ promise of American military
aid to Saudi Arabia in return for the kingdom’s business and security of interests.
American dollars spilled into Saudi Arabia because of the oil industry, which also
brought American interests and influence, angering many of the Wahhabi
fundamentalists present in Saudi Arabia. “Airport Wahhabis,” characterized as Saudi
aristocracy who engaged in non-Wahhabi activities, emerged from Saudi Arabia as a
result of this influx of wealth that “became an unparalleled symbol of debauchery,
292
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obstentation, and waste, as well as ignorance, prejudice and brutality.”297 This influx
of money, technology, and interests angered the Wahhabi society, thus globalization
“inevitably [undermined] Wahhabi domination in Arabia.”298
Wahhabi strength maintained its presence in Saudi Arabia through the boom
in the oil industry in the mid 20th century. With the war against Soviet Union in
Afghanistan in 1979, the Wahhabi campaign extended its reach. The mujahidin, or
the ‘Afghan Arabs,’ 299 were the young and restless youth fighting in the Afghanistan
jihad who used religious reform to instigate political mobilization. According to
Stephen Schwartz, Afghanistan gave the Wahhabi-Saudi power a chance to “impose
[its] own form of Islam under the pretext of defending Muslims . . . launched [its]
most ambitious attempt to date at direct religious colonization of a Muslim country
that was neither Arab nor a neighbor of Arabs.”300 The US also supported the war in
Afghanistan through financial aid and military support for the mujahidin, training the
young soldiers American tactics in warfare, such as the use of the car bomb.301
However, after the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan, the ‘Afghan Arabs’ switched
their efforts from fighting the Communists to bringing about the global Wahhabi
campaign to revive Islam in Muslim communities. The Wahhabi-Saudi movement
“attempted Wahhabization of these countries and the destruction of their indigenous
Islamic cultures, which were and remain mainstream Sunni, Suffi, and pluralist.”302
Iran, the Shi’a radical Islamic state, posed a threat to the Wahhabi-Saudi movement,
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as well as to the US because of Khomeini’s aggressive rule. Iraq, ruled by Saddam
Hussein, also opposed Iran, which the US quickly sent aid and arms to in support of
the invasion of Iran. Consequently, the US supported Iraq and the Saudi line, however
unaware of the real Wahhabi agenda against Iran.303
The world of Wahhabism separated reality into two human societies, the
“house of war” and the “house of peace,” similar to the Communist’s divided world
between capitalist and socialists.304 “They sought an ummah sufficient unto itself,
with no ‘external’ relations except those between Wahhabi rulers and the minority in
their subjects . . . all others were to be liquidated, beginning with the Shi’ia and
Sufis.” 305 Arabian youth, specifically in Saudi Arabia, blamed the decline in
civilization, Western colonization, and disenfranchisement of the Palestinians on the
Saudi rulers who relied heavily on Western influence.306
The 18th century Wahhabi movement stressed the need for a strict
interpretation of the Qur’an and hadith to mobilize a political movement against the
Ottomans and the British, which is often perceived as puritanical and extreme. In
addition to the conversation on al-Wahhab’s ideologies, Sayyid Qutb, the most
powerful Egyptian voice of radical Islam that protested against both Arab nationalism
and Western hegemony in the 20th century307, must be looked at to
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Sayyid Qutb
While many great Islamists supplemented the Islamic fundamentalist
movement in the 20th century, Sayyid Qutb is known as the “godfather and martyr of
Islamic radicalism.”308 Sayyid Qutb Ibrahim Husayn Shadhili was born October 9th,
1906 in a small town in Upper Egypt called Musha. Throughout Qutb’s childhood
and early adulthood, Egypt was under foreign occupation by the British until 1955
when with the British withdrew from the Suez Canal. Egypt was bombarded with
modernization because of its control under a Western monarchy, which was resisted
with Islamic resurgence. In his youth, he was educated the traditional Islamic form,
and later in the secular form while in college in Cairo. One can see the linear
progression of Qutb’s ideologies of militant jihad that stem from his response to the
repressive Egyptian state reacting from British rule, and past French rule, in the late
1950’s and 1960’s.309
After completing his education, Qutb traveled to America in 1948 to study
school curricula. While at first an admirer of the US, Qutb became disillusioned by
the American vices in society, which were comprised of the “combination of
secularism and materialism that in his opinion had resulted in moral laxity,
exploitation, oppression, and racism.”310 Religion was not a guiding factor in the
American public life, where human laws and thought were given more precedence
than divine revelation and law. John Esposito notes that Qutb’s experience in
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America “produced a cultural shock that made him more religious and convinced him
of moral decadence of the West.”311
After traveling to the US, Qutb began to invoke jahiliyyah, to denote the
condition of the world312 rather than the period before the rise of Islam. Seen in the
introduction of an Indian Muslim thinker colleague’s book, What Has the World Lost
as a Result of the Decline of Muslims, Qutb freely uses jahiliyyah to show the
condition in which the world is without Islam, “humanity [being] corroded by a
criminally luxurious and wasteful life on the one hand, and hopelessness and
frustration and despair on the other.”313 Previously, Qutb had used synonyms of
jahiliyyah in the historical sense, like jahalah, jahilin, and jahiliyyah.314
After his experiences with jahili society in the US, in 1951 Qutb joined the
Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist organization in Egypt founded by Hassan al-Banna.
His membership was a result of the blending of his distate for the Western culture, the
US support for the state of Israel in 1948, Egypt’s alignment with Russia, and secular
nationalism in Egypt.315 As a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qutb filled the
vacuum left after the assassination of al-Banna and “became an editor of its journal
and established himself right away as Islamism’s principal theoretician in the Arab
World.”316 After World War II, several organizations were born in response to their
post-war status still under imperial authority, like the Ba’ath party as a anticolonialist
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party.317 All organizations demanded Egypt’s full independence from Britain
following World War II in 1952, which paralleled with other Egyptian groups’
interests, such as the Free Officers led by army colonel Gamal Abd al-Nasser.
However, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Free Officers clashed because of their
differing ideologies. The Free Officers were secular in orientation, following Arab
nationalism, with Nasser’s ideas “[centering] on the unification of the Arab nation
and modernization of Arab society, under Egyptian leadership, as a means of reviving
their past greatness.”318 Nasser also did not believe that the fight for an Arab revival
was through the religious purification of fundamentalism, but rather as a consequence
of ethnic solidarity and social reform.319 On the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood
favored Islam as the basis for the identity and construction for Arab alliance. Qutb
firmly believed in the Egyptian Ikhwan, or totalitarian system of an ideological
militia, filled with the fundamental separatism and supremacism similar to
Wahhabism.320
Tensions between the Brotherhood and Nasser erupted in 1954, leading to
Qutb’s subsequent imprisonment because of his prominent position in the
Brotherhood. Qutb was tortured extensively in prison where he wrote, “In the Shade
of the Qur’an” using Qur’anic commentary. Qutb wrote extensively in prison where
he became progressively more radically Islamist, including his views on jihad to
oppress Western influences and the secular regime that grew from it. “His hostility to
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the West expressed itself in an exaltation of his concepts of ‘jihad.’”321 In 1966,
Nasser executed the incarcerated Qutb as an attempt to quell the emotions that Qutb
had instilled in the Islamic fundamentalist movement.
A shift is seen in Qutb’s work in the 1960’s from moderate to radical in his
two books, Social Justice in Islam and Milestones. Qutb’s criticizing writing style
evoked a “profound anger and revulsion, which translated into a revolutionary
vision.322 In his later years, he “disowned” most of what he had written during the era
of his secularist views, which included Social Justice in Islam, which he then rewrote.
Sayyid Qutb wrote Social Justice in Islam, or Al-‘Adalah al-Ijitima’iyyah fi
al-Islam, in 1949, representing his initial political and theoretical position of Islamic
society in the modern world.323 After traveling to the US, Qutb wrote, Social Justice
in Islam that came out of his concern for the political corruption, social stress,
economic inequality and the continuing European imperialism in Egypt. Each of the
book’s six versions show the progression of Qutb’s changing views from his life in
Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood and during his incarceration.324 “He took the
lead in attacking the social conditions and in preparing the ground for social
reform.”325 Yet the real evolution of Qutb’s views came with the publication of
Milestones.
Qutb’s Milestones, written in 1948, was (and still is) one of the most
influential primary sources for Islamic fundamentalism. It was his first Islamic book,
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and continued to be published until 1964 that subsequently lead to his re-arrest for an
accusation of conspiracy against Nasser.326 Qutb introduces the book by calling on
Islam to revive the world from the Western system that possesses values and a way of
life not warranted to be the leader of mankind.327 The documentary, God’s Warriors,
states that the “vanguards” of the Islamic world saw Milestones as “the manifesto of
the jihadi movement.” Kamal Al-Saad Habib, an individual interviewed in the
documentary, was a member of an Islamic jihadist group in Egypt during Qutb’s
lifetime. Habib sees Qutb’s work as a call to arms: “America and the Western world
have a moral problem. They look at the human being only from a materialistic point
of view.”328 Fawaz Gerges, a CNN Middle East Consultant, also noted Qutb’s work,
specifically Milestones, concerning the Muslim mission in life: “Your mission in life
is to replace the secular, non-Muslim society-government that exists in this part of the
world with authentic Islamic state, and you must do it. You must do it using all means
at your disposal.”329
According to the Muslim minority of Islamic fundamentalists, Milestones was
to engage the beginning of a revolution “to be carried out via jihad as holy war,
which was declared to be the ongoing, permanent duty of Muslims as they engaged in
the cosmic battle of good versus evil, played out in every life.”330 To the current
Islamist community, it is a classic manifesto for action framed around Qutb’s
rejection of Western influence in Egyptian life in the 1960’s.331
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Milestones is made up of a three--part analysis: the ills of modernity
(jahiliyyah), a cure to jahiliyyah in the form of Islamic law, and a method of
implementing the cure.332 Islam is vital to the jahiliyyah society so that the “humanity
of man” can be awakened and developed, seen through the invocation of jihad. Jihad
is used to eliminate the jahili authorities, such a political systems or material powers,
which remove individuals’ freedom from forming Islamic ideas and serving Allah,
known as Islamic din. According to Roxanne Euben, Islam “seeks to abolish all those
systems and governments that are based on the rule of some men over others.”333
Institutions and traditions that limit the freedom of human beings and distorts human
nature should be destroyed, serving as an obstacle for individuals from humanity’s
freedom and choice.334 Roxanne Euben also notes that “this leaves no option for
Islam but to fight against them in order to remove all obstacles from the path to
universal human freedom. Only this manner can life be wholly dedicated to Allah.”335
Jahiliyyah society must follow Islam’s declaration of faith, “La ilaha illa
Allah” (no god but Allah) to create a foundation for a true, Islamic community based
on the worship of Allah alone. According to Qutb, societies that do not fully submit
to Islamic din are jahili societies that do not dedicate themselves to the submission of
Allah alone in ideas and beliefs are a jahili society.336 Qutb also declares that “all
existing so-called ‘Muslim societies’ are also jahili societies”337 due to the lack of
absolute submission to Allah. The world becomes divided into separate states of dar332
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al-Islam (home of Islam) where Islamic shar’iah law is enforced, and dar-al-harb
(home of hostility), where Islamic shar’iah law is neglected,338 neither being able to
coexist with the other. 339 Qutb’s worlds of darl-al-Islam and darl-al-harb “recast the
world into black and white,”340 with no shades of gray. With the success of a state of
dar-al-Islam, Allah and the Qur’an will remove all forms of jahiliyyah to make that
land pure.
At the end of Milestones, Qutb addresses the vanguards for which the book is
dedicated to. The vanguard is charged with understanding the struggle on earth as a
triumph of faith as well as a struggle perceived by Allah in the Thereafter that dictates
humanity’s purpose.341 Vanguards are called to enact religious reform that is meant to
establish political mobilization favorable to Islamic fundamentalism. Qutb warns
vanguards that enemies will try to change the struggle into an economic or political
issue to “deprive them of their weapons for true victory,”342 which he commands
believers to disregard. Islam is to take the world out of disparity, notes Qutb, and
must not be “a camp follower.”343 Qutb’s final words are used to bolster the
vanguards when empowering the dar-al-Islam against the dar-al-harb, described as
the “spirit of materialism,” inspiring the heart of the Islamic fundamentalist to strive
against jahili society that has held a predominant position in world affairs.
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Qutb’s other works
In addition to Social Justice in Islam and Milestones, in 1951 Qutb wrote two
books that discuss the liberation of man from controlling and dominating forces, The
Battle between Islam and Capitalism, and Islam and Universal Peace.
The Battle between Islam and Capitalism shows his interest in understanding
and describing the problems of the royal, Western capitalist system and its negative
impact on Egyptian society.344 Egypt must distance itself from hegemonic forces,
such as France, that do not understand the tension between the legislation and the
spirit of the people. To respond to the problems of the capitalist system in Egypt,
Islam must be used to disregard all the other powers in the world that are attempting
to do the same thing. The only way for the ummah to prosper is to be ruled by
shari’ah law,345 emphasizing religion to initiate political mobilization. It must go
back to the great ‘aqidah (creed): “This great ‘aqidah today, in the case of Egypt, is
not anything but Islam.”346
Islam and Universal Peace notes that “Islam, unlike secular ideologies, is
divinely inspired guidance and is able to establish both justice and peace in the
world.”347 The world will continue to suffer until Islam is given the leadership to
“lead the perplexed (ha’ir) humanity to justice, order, and peace.”348 This peace will
arise from the Islamic liberation of man, which is the religious duty for every Muslim
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to liberate the world from the unjust rule, regardless of religion or predominant
governance. The path to peace will be through jihad against the jahili society.349
The perspective of Qutb’s influence on the Islamic fundamentalist mindset
against jahili society concerning jihad varies in degree and purpose. According to Bin
Jani, author of Sayyid Qutb’s View of Jihad, Qutb did not believe in the armed
struggle per se, yet called for an alternative method. First, a vanguard of Islam must
be set up as a “catalyst for the creation of an Islamic society that is suppose to replace
the existing jahili society,” to unite all Muslims under a single Islamic organization.
Its main duty is the propagation of da’wah through persuasion, argumentation, and
education to oppose jahiliyyah. Only with the help of the vanguard will an authentic
Islamic society be accomplished to transform their movement into a religio-political
unit, separating completely from the jahili society. However, according to John
Esposito in Unholy War, Qutb’s jihad was more radical in nature. While explained as
an “armed struggle in the defense of Islam against the injustice and oppression of the
West and the East,” it stands as an important ideology to numerous radical jihad
extremist groups. A jihad is to be waged against the “Western threat as a political,
economic, and religio-cultural conflict,”350 in addition to the elites of the Muslim
world that support them.
Roxanne L. Euben sees Qutb’s experience with Nasser in Egypt as a clue to
understanding and discussing the world and jahili society. Qutb’s aversion to
modernity is not due in part to technology, progress, or worldliness, but to the
openness to Westernization and commitment to secularization imposed by previous
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imperial rule.351 Man-made sources of authority become Qutb’s true rival, like the
Egyptian President Nasser who believed in secular nationalism. Additionally, an
authentic Islamic society will only be accomplished through the active participation
“in the realization of the Islamic way on Earth,”352 through the enactment of a jihad.
In this strange paradox, Islam brings freedom to the jahili society yet insisting that
Allah’s sovereignty must be accepted. This turns into an unapologetic offensive,
which is necessary to bring about a more Islamic way of life to the world. Even while
reading Qutb’s Milestones, his language gradually develops an image of a winnable
battle between good and evil for the vanguards, calling for a jihad against the jahili
society rooted in materialism, sexual permissiveness and permiscuity, free use and
abuse of alcohol, and its racism.353
The resonating theme between al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb is their emphasis
on religious reform for freedom (to follow Islam) that is hindered by invading forces
reminiscent of colonial powers. A call for a religious revival merges with the concern
to change the political influences that attempt to modernize societies in the Middle
East. For this reason, a jihad against the jahili society that supports these powers is
perceived as just and gives a tangible purpose. Through our development of the 18th
and 20th century thinkers’ ideologies, a discussion of the current response of Islamic
fundamentalism resulting from the previous ideologies can be examined.
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The current Islamist mindset
After September 11, an examination of Saudi Arabia was instigated by the
fact that 15 out of the 19 hijackers were of Saudi background. With this said, the
current demographics of Saudi Arabian society must be looked at in order to piece
together one perspective from the Middle East. This is not making the assumption
that all hijackers are Saudi, or that all Saudis are hijackers, yet brings to light certain
factors of Saudi Arabia that can influence the Islamic fundamentalist perspective.
According to Michael Klare, despite the US’ hesitance to admit the instability of
Saudi Arabia, the kingdom “[became] a scene of social, economic, political, a
religious ferment.”354 From 1950 to 2002, Saudi Arabia’s population grew from 3.2
million people to 21.7 million people with 75% of the population under the age of
thirty and 50% under the age of eighteen.355 The kingdom also experienced a drop in
its per capita income, from $28,600 in 1981 to $6,800 in 2001, followed by an
approximate 30% unemployment rate under thirty that, according to Richard Booney,
“may fuel support for militancy.”356 Well-educated and ambitious men were left often
alienated and “with high expectations and few economic opportunities- perfect fodder
for political or religious extremists.”357
Saudi Arabian society in the 21st century became discontent for three reasons
due to the emerging Western presence and influence in their kingdom. First, the
continuing US military presence left over from Operation Desert Storm in 1990
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angered some in the Saudi community, who saw the occupation as a stab to the
spiritual heart of Islam with the dwelling infidels. Second, the Saudi state was
angered by the US’ continuing support for Israel and the war against the Palestinians,
which directly refuted the Saudi-US alliance to consider Arab interests in addition to
Israeli ones. Third, some in the Saudi society saw the royal family as having been
corrupted due to Western petrodollar wealth, which caused it to move away from the
path of Islam, losing “its mantle of legitimacy.”358 “The result [was] the intrusion of
Western values at the expense of Muslim principles, the corruption of Saudi princes
and officials, and dependence on the United States.”359
In addition to adopting Western lifestyle habits, the royal family received
“commissions” from foreign companies, usually Western, to secure interests and
allies. Commissions were passed on to Islamic fundamentalists to reconcile their
conflicts with the Saudi regime because of their fear of losing power. Unfortunately,
the reverse happened with “an explosion of anti-Americanism, a deepening anger at
the royal family, and a steady stream of recruits to Al Qaeda and other extremist
organizations.”360 From the Western perspective, the only way to combat these
resentments was to support the Saudi regime and royal family.
Still to this day, the Saudi royal family lives a life of contradictions. It
attempts to appease the Saudi Wahhabi campaign and maintain an alliance with the
US at the same time,361 which is the exact complaint that many current Islamic
fundamentalists hold as a justification for their global jihad.
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While the teachings and theories of al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb have
strengthened the Islamic fundamentalist movement’s justifications concerning the
ummah, jahiliyyah, and jihad, the real strength lies in their representation of
contemporary Western societies as well as the “Muslim sense of historic oppression,
occupation, and injustice at the hands of the West.”362 In 18th century Saudi Arabia,
the Wahhabi movement developed from a reaction against the Ottoman Empire and
the British, similarly to the 20th century Egyptian reactionary movement against
British rule. Relgious reform becomes alike with political mobilization. The examples
of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda will be used to demonstrate the evolved power of
the movement in the 21st century responding to a “centuries-long tradition of reform
in Islam, most of it aimed at the last one hundred years toward the struggle over
Muslim oppression by the West.”363 Through bin Laden’s identification with many
mainstream and extremist Muslim grievances and perceptions, he seeks to legitimate
and mobilize the “’Muslim street’, or general population.”364

Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda
Osama bin Muhammaed bin Laden was born in Saudi Arabia in 1957 to a
wealthy family with close ties with the ruling al-Saud family. Osama Bin Laden was
educated in economics but preferred Islamic studies, and was taught by Abdallah
Azzam and Muhhammad Qutb (the brother of Sayyid Qutb). After briefly working in
Saudi Arabia for his family’s construction empire, bin Laden experienced a “turning
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point”365 in his life when became involved with the jihad in Afghanistan and helped
organize the flow of Saudi funds and equipment to the mujahidin in addition to US’
support in Afghanistan. After the war ended, the mujahidin were “left orphaned and
warring amongst each other in Peshawar,”366 prompting bin Laden to return to Saudi
Arabia. Upon return, bin Laden was initially viewed as a hero, but gradually became
in conflict with the royal family when he felt bound within the confines of a regime
whose policies and alliances he more and more came to despise as corrupt and unIslamic. However, in light of the invasion of Kuwait, bin Laden offered the Saudi
kingdom the protection of the ‘Afghan Arabs,’ and in place took the support offered
by the US. This period in the kingdom’s history represents the defining moment for
bin Laden in his anger towards the US, Saudi Arabia, and the encroaching powers of
the US. With this brief summary concerning bin Laden’s disagreement with the Saud
family, we can begin to understand the origins of bin Laden’s fundamentalist
perspective, where he and other Islamic radicalists “[paint] their liberal rivals and
opponents as traitors to Muslim civilizations.”367
The teachings and theories of Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb
represent earlier grievances against Western influence in the Middle East, which
influence the perception of the current Islamic fundamentalist movement. As a
current example of the Islamic fundamentalist resistance to the effects of
contemporary Western society, Osama bin Laden exists as a vanguard to address the
radical grievances and to bring the Muslim world back to the traditional Islamic ways.
Similar to Huntington, he portrays the conflict as being between the Judeo-Christian
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West and Islam: “America escalated its campaign against the Muslim world in its
entirety, aiming to get rid of Islam itself. Its main focus in this was to target the
scholars and the reformers who were enlightening the people to the dangers of JudeoAmerican alliances.”368 Using Islam as a justification and a unifying force, bin Laden
calls for the Arab world’s rejection of Western influences that restrict an individual’s
rights to accept Islam as a religion and way of life, seen in a call for jihad.369
As a result, bin Laden is portrayed in the Muslim world as an archetypical
Islamic warrior fighting a ‘battle between good and evil,’ akin to the Western’s notion
of Robin Hood, which supports the proliferation of Western interests that reflects
Huntington’s theory. According to Natana DeLong Bas, Huntington’s clash between
East versus West turns into a ‘rival exceptionalism,’ which “implies a portrayal of the
reality, or a false consciousness on the part of militant Islamists and their militant
equivalent in the United States.”370 The image of bin Laden as either a “freedom
fighter” or “terrorist” obscures the underlying basis of conflict for the clash of
interests over power and resources effected by Western influences. The elevation of
bin Laden to a mystical status and position detracts from the reality of the conflict for
power and resources.
Bin Laden’s primary focus was targeted at Saudi Arabia’s incorrect regime,
leading to the kingdom’s erosion of Islamic morals and lifestyles as a result of these
Western influences. Stated by bin Laden, the kingdom’s neglect of religion and
weakness of faith has led to the fall of the ummah. The following is a description of
the kingdom’s current state through the perception of bin Laden: “You are all aware
368
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of the degree of degradation and corruption to which our Islamic ummah has sunk, in
its government and in the feebleness and cowardice of many of its scholars in the face
of its enemies, as well as its internal divisions.”371 However, during the Afghan jihad
in the 1980’s, the US supported Saudi Arabia who backed the ‘Afghan Arabs,’ led by
bin Laden’s jihad against the Soviets. The symbiotic relationship between the US and
Saudi Arabia (and its “freedom fighters”) lasted until after Operation Desert Shield in
1991, when bin Laden felt betrayed by Saudi Arabia, which preferred US troops over
the ‘Afghan Arabs’ to protect the kingdom from invasion.
Bin Laden perceived this act as a betrayal of its Muslim brothers and
demanded a total elimination of US interests and presence from the ummah. In this
complaint he also held contempt concerning the US’ place in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. “’To erase this blight on the Muslim world’, he thundered, it was ‘an
individual duty for every Muslim’ to ‘kill the Americans’ and drive their armies ‘out
of the lands of Islam.’”372 In 1994, King Fuad of Saudi Arabia revoked Osama bin
Laden’s citizenship after his establishment of a mujahidin in Sudan from where he
then returned to Afghanistan. This furthered his revulsion and hate for the Saudi
leadership.
Bin Laden’s secondary focus are attributed to hostility towards the US, or
Western abuses, and the presence and preference of US troops in Saudi Arabia
during the Kuwaiti war with Saddam Hussein. The phenomenon of US presence in
the kingdom is not new due to the historical precedence of the Roosevelt-Ibn Saud
meeting in 1945 that legitimizes the kingdom’s protection from invading forces.
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Klare acknowledges the influence of bin Laden’s growing rage against (first) the
economic globalization and (second) the continued US support for Israel. A more
cognizant influence is attributed to the effect of resources in Middle Eastern societies,
namely oil, which makes the kingdom wealthier and more indulgent in Western
practices.
After Operation Desert Shield, bin Laden was tied to numerous attacks
targeting the US, beginning in 1995 with the bombing of the SANG headquarters in
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. ‘Fourth-generation’ warfare373 describes Osama bin Laden and
Al-Qaeda’s strategy as unconventional warfare to protect an imbalance of power,
seen in the attacks of September 11. ‘Fourth-generation’ warfare is the use of smallscale devices and light weaponry concerning the struggle against the “best-armed,
best-trained, and most experienced armies in the world (the USSR in Afghanistan, the
US in Somalia, Russia in Chechnya, and the Zionist entity in Lebanon).”374 It is also
characterized by its ghost-like presence, appearing and disappearing at whim. The
confrontation of ‘fourth generation’ warfare becomes extremely difficult due to its
alternative strategies for a “struggle for justice or a struggle for self-determination, or
contained elements of both.”375
By looking at two of bin Laden’s speeches around the time of his
campaign against the US in 1995, his future ideological motives can be foretold.
While bin Laden made statements prior to 1994, Bruce Lawrence concurs that the two
following speeches after 1994 were intended for a wider public audience. Following
his exile from Saudi Arabia, bin Laden’s public declarations addressed his view of the
373
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transformation of the Middle East as a betrayal to the ummah. First, in 1994 he
addressed Chief Mufti, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, or bin Baz, concerning his
endorsement of the Oslo Accords in 1993 between Israel and PLO. Bin Laden saw
the Saudi princes and officials as renouncing Islam, and considered them “sell-outs”
of Palestinian rights to Washington. The following quote illustrates bin Laden’s anger
with the Saudi government, which sided with the peace agreements with Israel.
And it seemed as if you were not satisfied with abandoning Saudi Arabia,
home of the two Holy Sanctuaries, to the Crusader-Jewish forces of
occupation, until you had brought another disaster upon Jerusalem, the
third of the Sanctuaries, by conferring legitimacy on the contracts of
surrender to the Jews that were signed by the traitorous and cowardly
Arab tyrants. These contracts constitute a serious and dangerous calamity
containing deceit and deception from a member of different perspectives.376
Accordingly, bin Laden contends that Palestine must be liberated from the ‘Jewish
enemy’ in order to return the ummah to Islamic sovereignty, enacted by a jihad as the
legal duty of Muslims.
In 1995, bin Laden sent a letter to bin Baz in Saudi Arabia denouncing the
stationing of American and foreign troops in the kingdom using scriptural support
from the Qur’an. ‘Honourable and righteous scholars’ are told to remember the
covenant made with God: “God took a pledge from those who were given the
Scripture-‘Make it known to your people; do not conceal it.’”377 Bin Laden designates
unnamed Saudi rulers and scholars “apostate collaborators with Western powers”378
who have brought about the fall of the ummah due to their neglect of religion and
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weakness of faith.379 The following quote illustrates bin Laden’s accusations of the
Saudi rulers’ bad behaviors.
All this happened on the watch of the region’s rulers, and with their
active participation--in fact, these are the people actually implementing
the plans for our umma’s enemies. This invasion was financed by these
rulers using our umma’s wealth and savings.380
Bin Laden accused the Saudi family of partaking in the fall of the ummah, which
turns the kingdom into an enemy equal to that of the US and its government.
Numerous quotes from the Qur’an are used to inspire sense of devotion to God for the
call to jihad to “spread knowledge, enjoin good, and forbid evil.”381 Similarly to alWahhab and Qutb, bin Laden employs religious reform for political mobilization.
Bin Laden uses the tenents of Islam (that people are familiar with) to
legitimize his efforts.382 In 1997, while discussing the justifications for the aggressive
jihad in Afghanistan, bin Laden attributed driving the Soviets out of Afghanistan and
establishing the Taliban government to God. “After the collapse of the Soviet Union-in which the US has no mentionable role, but rather the credit goes to God and the
mujahidin in Afghanitan . . .”383 Bin Laden does not acknowledge the CIA’s influence
in the success of driving out the communists from Afghanistan,384 and sees God’s
instrumental force as the contributing factor to the mujahidin and the Taliban
government. In 1998, Osama bin Laden emphasizes with the success of the Muslim
impact, and ignores the America influence: “[it] is not a force influenced from the
outside, as the Crusader Western media would have it, but a force that has come from
379
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within.”385 On October 7, 2001, Al-Jazeera aired a video recording of Osama bin
Laden expressing his praise for the attacks on September 11 as carrying out God’s
will. He avows, “God has struck America at its Achilles heel and destroyed its
greatest building, praise and blessings to Him.”386 He also refers to the ummah as
experiencing humiliation and contempt in the past eighty years, referring to the fall of
the Ottoman Empire and the development of Western influence in the Middle East
concerning power and oil.
The stylized themes of al-Wahhab and Sayyid Qutb are apparent in numerous
speeches by bin Laden, which further support the legitimation of justifications for his
global jihad. Whether or not bin Laden’s justifications for citing these two sources are
valid, their presence is felt in his speeches, which are broadcasted to millions of
Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the world.387 In his declaration of war against
the US, he brought together numerous elements from Muslim history with the
globalization for terrorist groups to enhance its global power, seen in “the ability to
harness religion and modern technology to strike anywhere, anytime, and
anyplace.”388
Bin Laden employs similar characteristics to al-Wahhab’s work when
discussing the need for moral reform in Saudi Arabia,389 seen in his interview with
Al-Jazeera in 2001.390 With al-Wahhab’s origins in Saudi Arabia, he underscores the
importance of the education of tawhid, which if violated in an act of shirk
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(polytheism), is an unforgivable sin. The proselytization of Islam is the mandatory
duty of all Muslims, which protects and enhances the Muslim community. In the
interview, bin Laden discusses generally the leaders in the Islamic world that are
being “tricked” by other leaders, alluding to the Saudi--US alliance that prevents the
proper proselytization of Islam. While arguing that peace will not end until Islam
prevails over the enemies of Islam, he quotes:
this situation is prevailing upon the Islamic world today, with its big
leaders, and its famous rulers--it is a trick; they [the rulers] trick people and
lie to them, but, with the permission of God, God’s liberation and release is
close, and the promised victory is close- God willing.391
The removal of the US from its presence in the ummah is the solution to the “ordeal,”
stated by bin Laden, emphasizing a battle between the Muslims and the global
Crusaders.
With respect to the influence of Sayyid Qutb in bin Laden’s mission, one must
look at the correlation between the two men. First, bin Laden’s most important
associate and ‘righthand man’, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was an Egyptian student and
follower of Sayyid Qutb since the age of 14, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood,
and is said to have a direct influence on bin Laden’s global jihad strategy.392 Second,
while in attending university, Bin Laden also was a student of Sayyid Qutb’s brother,
Muhammad Qutb. According to John Esposito, Sayyid Qutb’s work was a staple in
Islamic education, thus bin Laden must have been well versed in Qutb’s work. The
timing of bin Laden’s education also coincided with the time when Islamic
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movements and religious extremists, or jihad movements, were on the rise in the
broader Muslim world and within Saudi Arabia.393
Bin Laden uses similar thematic styles as Qutb, seen in his use of jahilliyah, to
describe the ills of modernity, and jihad, the strategy to rid the world of these
obstructing ills to allow for freedom to form Islamic ideas. In Milestones, Qutb
portrays the battle as a triumph of faith against the jahiliyyah society, and calls the
vanguard of Islam to empower the darl-al-Islam (home of Islam) against the darl-alharb (home of hostility). In an October 2001 interview with Al-Jazeera, bin Laden
emphasizes the West’s detrimental influence on the ummah: “It is that this Western
civilization, which is backed by America, has lost its value and appeal,”394 and
hinders the freedom, human rights, and equality of Muslims in the world. The
Western civilization, and the US government, is blamed for taking the world into a
“choking life”395 that the Muslim world cannot tolerate. Jihad becomes mandatory for
all Muslims to rid the Islamic lands from the infidels of Western culture, which Qutb
similarly calls for.
While recognizing the similarities in ideological principles between the three
revolutionary thinkers, a more elusive predicament occurs from the mixture of
Islamic fundamentalist thought. The public perception in the minds of Muslims and
non-Muslims occurs between the Islamic fundamentalist movement of al-Wahhab,
Sayyid Qutb, and bin Laden. By using similar themes to previous revolutionary
thinkers from the Muslim world that use religious reform for political mobilization,
bin Laden seeks to support and legitimize his radical Islam to the listening world.
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Bin Laden also further supports Huntington’s “West” versus “East” paradigm
by portraying the conflict as a ‘heavenly battle’ between the US and the Arab-Islamic
world. Commenting on the American and British attacks in Iraq in 1998 called
Operation Desert Fox, bin Laden notes the American excuse of “bringing Iraq to
account and to justice”396 and ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein, yet claims that its true
motives are to strike the “growing power of the Arab and Islamic world.”397 Bin
Laden sees the US and Israel as a growing ‘tyranny’ with great contempt for
Muslims. He asks the Muslim peoples to act upon these injustices by any means
necessary, even with jihad where death “is predestined and decided,” as a duty to
“motivate our ummah to jihad for the sake of God against Americans and Israelis and
their allies.”398 Similarly in his interview in October 2001, bin Laden perceives the
US as fighting against Islam under the pretext of fighting against terrorism,399
furthering the image of the evil US fighting against the pure, moral Muslim society of
the Middle East. However, Osama bin Laden downplays the importance of oil that
influences US interests in the region, and instead explains the US interests as fighting
against Islam to bolster support from Muslims around the world.
In order to declare a jihad against the Jews and Crusaders, bin Laden issued
the World Islamic Front declaration in 1998.400 With this declaration, he was able to
stir the Arabs and Muslims’ sentiments through religious discourse when speaking
about American presence in the Gulf and Palestine. Bin Laden uses the justifications
that “Muslims were under siege, their lands occupied in a world dominated by their
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historic enemies, militant Christianity and Judaism.”401 bin Laden’s declaration of a
fatwa (authoritative legal opinion) was to detail obligation to wage jihad against
“Americans, military and civilians, until they quit the lands of the ummah.”402
However, the fatwa was signed by four otherindividuals to reinforce its power due to
the concern over bin Laden’s lack of necessary religious qualifications to issue a
fatwa. Al-Zawahiri was one individual who signed the fatwa in addition to the three
leaders and representatives from Egypt and Pakistan. Despite the portrayed image of
bin Laden as a vanguard for the Muslim world, many discrepancies exist with his
image and the Islamic tradition that he proselytizes. The manner in which he is
portrayed by the neocon interests of Western European cultures is to mask the source
of conflict in the Middle East as one over resources. A phantom enemy, coined by the
documentary The Power of Nightmares, is created.
Three factors show the inaccuracy of the image of bin Laden. First, the US
created the tangible character of bin Laden to explain the attacks on the US from the
Muslim world. In order to prosecute bin Laden for the 1998 bombing in East Africa
that killed over 200 people, American law required evidence of a criminal
organization “that would allow them to prosecute the head of the organization even if
he could not be linked directly to the crime.”403 The testimony of a witness named
Jamal al-Fadl was used to bolster the image of Al-Qaeda as bin Laden’s organization,
showing enough evidence to materialize an organization. “The reality was that bin
Laden and al-Zawahari had become the focus of a loose association of disillusioned
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Islamist militants who were attracted by the new strategy.”404 Before the US’ use of
Al-Qaeda, it acted similar to a venture capital firm “providing funding, contacts, and
expert advice to many different militant groups and individuals from all over the
Islamic world.”405 Interestingly, Jamal al-Fadl was an enemy of bin Laden’s, and was
granted witness protection along with thousands of dollars for his testimony about AlQaeda. With the US’ creation of Al-Qaeda as a global organization, the US was able
to prosecute individuals much more easily, turning bin Laden into an internationally
identified radical Islamist. Bin Laden agrees that the West named Al-Qaeda as an
international organization, when the name actually originates from a military base in
Afghanistan to train men during the Cold war that translates into, “The Base.”406
Second, Osama bin Laden influences the global jihad movement through
economic involvement rather than anything else. Khalid Sheik Mohammed, an
Islamist militant, was the planner behind the attack on September 11, not bin Laden
who provided funds and help in finding volunteers. Here again, due to bin Laden’s
“link” to Al-Qaeda, he became the central focus.
Third, the inconclusive hunt for bin Laden and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan
shows their thoroughly elaborated portrayal by the Western media and the US’
foreign policies. Bin Laden and his organization were thought to be in the mountains
of Tora Bora, which was enlarged even more with depiction of a secret, underground
hideout in The Times of London. As the mountains of Tora Bora (Afghanistan) were
bombed, caves thought to be hiding Al-Qaeda network members proved inconclusive.
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Al-Qaeda as the global organization did not exist, and became a phantom enemy. The
documentary, The Power of Nightmares, asserts that the “idea of a coherent,
structured terrorist network with an organized capability simply does not exist.”
From the Muslim perspective, the perceived battle between the West/US and
the Middle East is seen as a ‘cosmic’ and perennial battle,407 regardless of the
Qur’anic forbiddance of the unjust killing of anyone seen in Q. 5:32:
. . . if any one slew a person--unless it be for murder or for spreading
mischief in the land--it would be as if he slew the whole people: and
if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole
people.408
There is no moral justification for the leadership of Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda
in Islam, which uses ruthlessness and cost-effectiveness to carry out its tactics rather
than new technology.
The Power of Nightmares uses the label of a “phantom enemy” to express the
mystical entity that the US (and the Muslim world) have fed into that reinforces the
US’ hidden agenda for international influence and power over resources. The twisted
image of a phantom enemy strengthened the neocons in the White House due to the
dichotomy of good and evil forces. The representation of a phantom force seen during
the Cold War continued with the figure of bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, corporeal forces
that the US could construct in order to maintain a favorable world order and destiny.
The fundamentalist response of bin Laden and Al-Qaeda to the changing world
confirms the “East” versus “West” paradigm from Huntington’s “clash of
civilizations” theory, which does not make a valid argument.
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Conclusion
Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab (the Wahhabi movement) and Sayyid Qutb used
methods of the Islamic revival to coerce a political mobilization against foreign
powers and influence. Foreign powers included the Ottoman Empire in the 18th
century and the British in the 20th century, which also framed their ideological
positions concerning Islamic fundamentalism. In the 21st century, the Islamic
fundamentalist movement built upon these ideologies to form a resistance to the
modernization of societies resulting from Western, mainly US, influence.
Huntington’s theory of religion as the source of conflict is proved false, and conflict
is instead produced by structural pressures exerted on Middle Eastern societies seen
through the development of the two natural resources in the region, oil and water. As
a result of these two influences, a change in power occurs that transforms political,
economic, and social issues.
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Chapter 4:
Resource Wars: Conflict over Oil

Introduction
The Persian Gulf remains the world’s largest oil producing region to supply
“the burgeoning American and international [oil] demand” in the 21st century.409 Iran,
Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates hold the region’s, and the
worlds, largest proven reserves, the untapped petroleum reserves known to exist that
can be extracted through existing technology. As of 2003, these six nations “jointly
posses 664 billion barrels of proven reserves, or about 64% of the world’s known
supplies,”410 while the US and European powers combined only hold 18%.
Surprisingly, the Gulf’s production capacity is lower than many other oil producers,
such as the United States, Mexico and Russia because of its relatively new oil
extraction technology.
In the years to come, the Gulf region will be capable of increasing its oil
production and output, to be exported to nations, like the US, that continue to rely
heavily on imported oil. As a result, as the resources of the older oil--producing
nations dwindle in availability and amount, the Gulf nations will become even more
important for the international oil industry. According to Michale Klare, “With each
passing year, the Gulf producers will supply an ever-increasing share of the world’s
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oil intake.”411 The Gulf region will be the sole majority supplier of oil to other
nations, and will be able to do so because of its relatively small domestic demand
compared to larger nations like the US.
Conflict will arise from the struggle over resources rather than Huntington’s
problematic “West” versus “East” paradigm. The chapter will outline how the US
became dependent on foreign oil and its relation with Middle Eastern nations before
and after its dependence on Middle Eastern oil, specifically from Saudi Arabia.

History of Oil and its US-Arab relationship
America’s dependence
The year of 1859 marks the birth of the US’ dependence on oil for its
booming economy, domestic and foreign policy, and population “drunk in
consumption.”412 The domestic discovery of oil was made in Titusville Pennsylvania
in 1859, leading to the first large-scale petroleum industry.413 In 1901, the US became
the world’s dominant oil producer with the discovery of oil in southeast Texas.414
Various large-scale organizations developed to capitalize on the discovery, like John
D. Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company, which was the base for Exxon Mobil,
Chevron, Amoco, and Atlantic Richfield. Cheap and abundant supplies of petroleum
raised America’s domestic and foreign status as the most powerful world leader
allowing for its quick dominant position during World War II.
411
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In 1942, the US was the leader in oil production with 20 billion barrels of oil,
allegedly half of the world’s total oil reserves.415 In addition to oil’s domestic use to
support the ‘American dream’, allied victory was assisted by US oil, allowing for the
invention and usage of exceptional warfare weapons such as tanks, airplanes,
submarines, aircraft carriers, boats, and armored troops carriers in addition to the
capability to support these modes from domestic reserves.416 Oil turned into a
national security matter as the war progressed during Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
administration. By 1942, the US was using four million barrels of domestic oil per
day, which would be consumed in thirteen years at that rate.417 Roosevelt’s concern
lay not only in the rapid depletion of US oil reserves, but the acceleration of US’
dependence on foreign oil once domestic supplies ran out. Commodore Andrew F.
Carter of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board is quoted as concurring that the known
petroleum US reserves are “inadequate to meet over a period of years either the
wartime needs of the United States or the needs of the civilian economy once normal
conditions are established.”418 The Middle East’s untouched land and large supplies
of oil became the US’ primary concern for national security.
The biblical story of the Eternal Fires during Nebuchadnez’zar’s rule reveal
the thousands-year-old existence of oil in the Middle East.419 Oil was first discovered
in the Middle East in Iran in 1908, yet the first substantial oilfield was discovered in
1927 in Iraq’s Kirkuk, 2,500 yards from the site of the Eternal Fires. On the western
side of the Persian Gulf however, the real oil profits of the Middle East lay in Saudi
415
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Arabia, explored 30 years after the discovery in Iran. The US government did not
forge any formal diplomatic relations until 1939, nor post a residential ambassador in
the kingdom until 1943. The end of World War II heralded a new era of resource
management that determined the US’ resource interests abroad, especially towards
Saudi Arabia.

Oil in Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia’s oil legacy began in 1923 with the New Zealander, Major Frank
Holmes, who was the first person to suggest the exploration of oil in Arabian
Peninsula.420 Holmes established the first oil concession in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern
Providence in 1925, which was handed over to Gulf Oil, a global oil company, who
proclaimed that the area did not contain adequate levels of oil for extraction. With
this concession, numerous American and British officials argued with Saudi King,
Abdul Aziz Al Saud, over the permission for oil exploration.
In 1933, the American group, named SOCAL (Standard Oil of California),
allied with two of the best geologists in Bahrain and made a sixty-year concession
with Saudi Arabia that granted them the rights to search for oil in the kingdom.
Western interest in Saudi Arabia came at a perfect time for the one-year-old kingdom
and King Saud. During King Saud’s first year of rule, Saudi Arabia’s economy
weakened because of the drop in Muslim pilgrimages to Mecca, the kingdom’s main
form of revenue, bankrupted Saudi Arabia.421 US groups also faced the effects of the
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global depression, seen in the drop of the gold standard and the closing of U.S. banks,
which surprisingly didn’t stop their exploration.
SOCAL directed its exploration efforts towards al-Hasa, a promising area
along the kingdom’s Persian Gulf coast (first) because of its geologically similar
qualities to Kuwait, Iraq, and Persia, and (second) because no European companies
held any land in this area. In 1936 SOCAL struck oil at the oilfield known as
Damman No. 7 in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia, which led to the
establishment of the state-owned national oil company, the Arabian American Oil
Company, or Aramco.422 To help fund these oil campaigns, Texaco, Exxon and Mobil
Oil Company became shareholders of the Aramco nation in 1946 to “provide more
investment capital,” they being three out of the original “Seven Sisters” (Exxon,
Shell, BP, Mobil, Chevron Texaco and Gulf).423 SOCAL established the CaliforniaArabian Standard Oil Company (CASOC) as an infrastructure to develop the field,
which later struck oil in 1938 on the Persian Gulf coast opposite of Bahrain.424 An
aggressive search for oil began in the Middle East that quickly escalated to match the
increasing demand for oil from the US. Saudi Aramco quickly became one of the
most sophisticated petroleum organizations in the world.425
In 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt and King Saud met on the USS Quincy in
Egypt, representing one of the few trips that King Saud made outside of his kingdom.
There are no official transcripts from this meeting, but it can be deduced that the two
men discussed issues pertaining to the kingdom as well as the US-Saudi relationship.
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According to Michael Klare, King Saud warned FDR of the conflict over the Jewish
homeland that would escalate if Israel were established due to the Jewish culture that
would differ greatly from other Arab cultures.426 It is debated whether or not the two
men discussed the issue of oil, but is highly likely due to Saudi Arabia’s large oil
reserves and the US’ urge to develop and “uphold the American firms’ dominance of
the oil fields.”427 A strong friendship emerged after the 1945 meeting between the two
men, most remarkably with FDR noting the importance of the Arab opinion
concerning issues over Palestine in addition to the Jewish one.
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia allowed the US to develop its oil fields due to
the wealth that Saudi Arabia would experience from the modernization. Before the
influx of wealth from oil, its GDP was “50% less than that of the poorest countries of
the OECD,” on a per capita basis.428 After the surge of wealth, its GDP “now pales in
comparison to some of its neighbors, such as Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and
Qatar.”429 According to Michael Klare, oil has become the backbone of Saudi Arabia,
which experiences a similar reliance, like the US’ dependence, on its natural resource.
The Saudi backbone supports modernization of the oil industry and economy, social
services, debt handling, employment, and the development of new industries.430

US’ attempt at economic and political stability in the Middle East
To ensure the business relationship between the US and Saudi Arabia, in 1941
FDR approved the Lend-Lease Act that “gave the president the authority to sell,
426
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exchange, lend, lease, or otherwise transfer military equipment to ‘any country whose
defense the president deems vital to the defense of the United States.”431 Developing
the case to aid to Saudi Arabia was an American national security issue, and in 1943
FDR finally declared the Lend-Lease act to the kingdom. However, the president felt
that the extension of the Lend-Lease act was insufficient for the protection of Saudi
oil from other interested nations, like Great Britain. Instead, the US government
“chose to collaborate with rather than supplant the giant American oil companies,”
through the public-private partnership. The partnership gave private interests the
power to enforce US foreign policy while the US government remained involved with
the security and stability of oil-producing regions in which private companies
operated.432 However, even with the Saudi-US alliance of 1945, the Lend-Lease Act
was problematic because “U.S. officials were constantly being forced to reconsider
their approach and launch new initiatives to bolster America’s position in the [Persian
Gulf],”433 in order to protect the region of Soviet influence during the cold war era.
Three great presidential edicts responded to this crisis: the Truman, Eisenhower, and
Nixon doctrines.
In 1947, the Truman Doctrine stated that America would assist any nation
threatened by Communism. The US saw the Soviet adventurism in the eastern
Mediterranean and northern Gulf states as a geopolitical threat, which was very close
to the Saudi Arabian oil fields. From the American perspective, oil supplies in the
Gulf region were compromised by the Soviet influence in the region, which prompted
US aid to the three nations most vulnerable to Soviet expansionism: Greece, Turkey,
431
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and Iran. Iran had the most controversial history with the Soviet Union due to its
occupation after World War II, especially due to its status as the Gulf’s leading oil
producer at the time.434 The strength of these northern nations would protect the
vulnerable and valuable oil-producing, Western-friendly nations in the Persian Gulf.
Subsequently, Saudi Arabia began to receive more aid from the Truman Doctrine to
buttress it for defensive capabilities in order to bolster its protection from Soviet
expansionism. As a result, the second form of presidential edicts resulted, the
Eisenhower Doctrine.
In 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was developed also in response to the threat
of Soviet expansion but focused on strengthening military forces against the Soviet
Union and Nasser’s Egypt. As discussed in Chapter Two, Nasser supported Arab
nationalism and despised the West, resulting in Egypt’s purchase of arms directly
from the Soviet Union. In response, the Eisenhower Doctrine “authorized the
president to use American combat forces to defend friendly Middle Eastern countries
against Soviet-backed aggressors and to provide additional arms and military
assistance to pro-American regimes.”435 The majority of this aid went to bolstering
and modernizing the Saudi military and air force, including the Department of
Defense’s support of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). Yet again, another
presidential edict would ensue, here as a result of the Vietnam War’s effect on the
American public regarding the foreign policy of American bloodshed in developing
worlds.
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In 1969, President Nixon knew that the nation would not support another
foreign war, yet needed to secure the US’ oil interests in the Persian Gulf. The Nixon
Doctrine was enacted to support the Persian Gulf oil interests through the indirect
economic and military backing of threatened nations, like Iran and Saudi Arabia. The
US wanted these nations to be responsible for their own security and defense and “to
cooperate among themselves to insure regional peace and stability.”436 Billions of
dollars of advanced weaponry were sent to Saudi Arabia and Iran in addition to
thousands of American military advisers and technicians to oversee the instruction of
the new weapons. In the following years, the relationships between both governments
of Saudi Arabia and Iran and the US would wither due to Saudi Arabia becoming
more suspicious of the US’ false alliance, and in Iran, the overwhelming distaste and
opposition for the American-imposed shah.

Backlash and the “Oil Sword”
The Saudi-imposed oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian Revolution in 1979
show the effect of the fallout of the presidential edicts to protect their interests in the
Middle East. The two events are symbolic of the aversion to the Nixon Doctrine that
was not well received in the Middle East.
The Saudi-imposed oil embargo occurred in October 1973 at the time of the
world’s greatest growth in global oil demands, a 250% increase from 1960 to 1970
from 20 million barrels to 60 million barrels.437 (The US reached maximum domestic
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production the year before,438 and Saudi Arabia had to increase its oil production in
order to supply the world’s oil needs.) The same year, King Faisal warned President
Nixon to rid Israeli occupation of the territory acquired from the Sixty-Day War in
1967, or else Saudi oil production would be curtailed. King Faisal turned Saudi oil
into a weapon, or the “oil sword,”439 used to threaten and manipulate the US’ foreign
policy. In order to preserve Saudi interests and the Saudi-US relationship, American
oil companies would have to “prove their loyalty” to the kingdom.440 Their strategic
position as the leading oil supplier and producer allowed them to act in this manner,
which gave them the rights to withhold trading with whomever they pleased.
Saudi Arabia’s three most productive oil fields, Ghawar, Abqaiq, and
Safaniya, produced 88% (2.973 million barrels a day) of the total 1970 oil output
(3.296 million barrels a day), led by Aramco.441 The West’s reliance shifted from
domestic to foreign oil in the 1970’s, which gave Saudi Arabia a tremendous amount
of power, capitalizing on the American-induced oil vacuum from its resource
potential. As a result, millions of dollars amounted in Saudi Arabia due to their
increase in the price of oil from $1 in 1970 to $12 in 1974, changing the kingdom’s
economy overnight.442 However, the overproduction of the three most viable oil fields
led to the dropping pressure and production of water in oil wells that added to the oil
shock of 1973.
Exacerbating to the problem was King Faisal’s increasingly skepticism of
Saudi Arabia’s American alliance for two reasons. First, the American dollar was
438
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weakening due to the soaring inflation rates, which strained many Middle Eastern
economies. Second, the American-Saudi alliance established by King Faisal’s father
and FDR was not maintained due to the US’ stance on Palestine when President
Truman supported the UN resolution of the creation of Israel that directly countered
the Arab agreement of 1945. Nixon supported Israel in 1973 when he announced his
re-arming of the state during the Yom Kippur War, greatly angering King Faisal as
well as destroying the trust between Saudi Arabia and the US.443 The oil shock
explanation changed from over-production to a Saudi-controlled reduction.
Saudi Arabia used the “oil sword” against the US when Saudi Arabia and nine
other oil ministers cut back oil production by 5% every month resulting in a dire
effect on the international oil market. “Though the amount of oil OPEC withheld was
small, its impact on the price of oil was enormous and more violent than most Arab
oil ministers had expected.”444 Looking at the economic and environmental problem
of the Saudi oil wells, according to certain sources, many Aramco officials were
aware of the problem. According to an article written by Seymour Hersh in the New
York Times, titled, “Saudi Oil Capacity Questioned,”445 the testimony of Aramco’s
owners agreed that the damage done to Saudi Arabian oil wells was due to the
increase in production to meet the world oil demand from 1970-74. Whether or not
these accusations are correct, the topic of the Senate hearing represents the US’ fear
of losing Middle Eastern interests that should be avoided at any cost. Hersh’s article
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was the only one to report the findings from the 1974 report, which even included
quotes from James B. Knight, Aramco’s vice president, stating that the oil well levels
were at acceptable levels, despite the report’s compromising claims. 446 At the end of
1973, the price of oil had increased fourfold to $11.65.
The Saudi-imposed oil embargo was eventually lifted. However, oil prices
continued to rise throughout the 1970’s. Simmons notes that the real reason for the
increase in oil prices was not King Faisal’s doing, but because of “the converging
trends- increased demand, shrinking market liquidity created the formula for
increasing prices.”447 By 1975, Saudi Arabia’s oil production was lowered to 6.6
million barrels a day by Aramco; however, this was changed a year later when the
kingdom and Iran became the sole oil producers in the world with adequate spare
capacity.448 The embargo highlights the West’s dependence on foreign oil, noting the
political relationship that oil held with economics.
The slow rejection of Western policies in the Middle East is also seen during
the Iranian Revolution when the American-imposed shah abdicated from the throne in
1979, and was replaced by Ayatollah Khomeini. “Iran was no longer a reliable shield
against Soviet incursion into the Gulf.”449 The Islamic militant takeover of the
American embassy in Tehran in 1979 further emphasized the loss of the delicate
relationship that the US had with Iran, which could no longer be counted as a reliable
source for protecting oil resource in the Persian Gulf.
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Responding to the overwhelming surge of needed security in the Persian Gulf,
in 1980 President Carter established the Carter Doctrine. Carter noted that access to
the Persian Gulf was a vital national interest, and the US would use “any means
necessary, including military force,” to protect these interests.450 The Rapid
Deployment Joint Task Force was established, “responsible for managing the U.S.
combat operations in the region.”451 The US sent military defensive support to Saudi
Arabia during the Iran/Iraq War to protect the Saudi oil fields close to the border with
Kuwait. In a similar tone as many of the past presidential promises vowing to protect
Middle Eastern nations, in 1981 President Reagan stated the importance of the US’
protection of Saudi Arabia’s oil.452
The Iran-Iraq War represents the US’ fear of another obstacle in between their
free flow of oil from the Middle East. When Iraq invaded Iran, the US remained
neutral, creating an international oil embargo on Iraq exports, including Kuwaiti
exports as well. However, once Iran gained the upper hand in 1982, the US “tilted”
towards Iraq, sending loans, intelligence support and arms.453 In light of maintaining
the Saudi-US alliance, the US “made it clear that the United States would protect
Saudi Arabia”454from attacks attributed to the war. War erupted in 1990 with Saddam
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait due to reason over oil, which was perfect for American
leaders who wanted Saddam to be thrown from power for various reasons. Iraq was
translated into an indisputable threat to American oil interests in the Persian Gulf. To
protect Saudi Arabia’s major oil fields in Eastern Province, American troops were
450
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sent to Saudi Arabia. The Bush administration, specifically Dick Cheney in 1990,
justified the invasion of Kuwait based on the Roosevelt—Ibn Saud meeting regarding
the deployment of American troops into the kingdom.455
Despite the Saudi King Fahd’s hesitance to allow the deployment of American
troops into the kingdom, Dick Cheney convinced the King to allow American forces
into the kingdom, yet under the condition that troops “must be withdrawn from Saudi
Arabia the minute the danger from Iraq had passed.”456 At the same time, the
“Afghan-Arabs,” led/financed by Osama bin Laden, leant their support to the
kingdom. However, King Fahd rejected the offer from the ‘Afghan-Arabs’, and
turned to the US for protection.457
In 2004, the Florida-based Centcom, or U.S. Central Command, was
established as the current implementation to protect Western security and power in
the Middle East regarding oil. It is the “nerve center for all U.S. military operations in
the Persian Gulf region.”458 The Carter Doctrine of January 23, 1980 originally
enunciated Centcom.459 Under the doctrine three years later, the Reagan
administration established the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) at the
MacDill Air Force Base to increase the number of forces in the Gulf region, which
eventually turned into the Central Command by President Ronald Reagan in 1983.
Both Reagan in 1987 and Bush in 1990 used Centcom forces to instill the American
hegemonic fear in the Middle East in hopes of expressing the “U.S. commitment to
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the flow of oil through the Gulf.”460 During and after the Persian Gulf War in 1990,
Centcom forces occupied the region, with its most memorable leader, Generel H.
Norman Schwazkopf, playing a large role in the defeat of Iraqi forces. Operation Iraqi
Freedom , begun in 2003, used Centcom forces to protect and defend “Iraq’s highly
vulnerable petroleum infrastructure.”461
As of 2005, Saudi Aramco had roughly 5,000 to 8,700 oil wells in Saudi
Arabia. However, Saudi Aramco statistics are debatable because of the lack of
credible evidence sent from the Saudi kingdom.462 Matthew Simmons’ book, Twilight
in the Desert, discusses the given evidence from Saudi Aramco detailing information
on Saudi oil fields. Simmons used SPE technical papers authored and published by
Aramco officials that detail facts and issues concerning the kingdom’s most
productive oil fields, as as Gwawar, as well as its attempt to find new oil fields.
Despite Aramco’s fallacious evidence and reports of oil production, Simmon notes
that the underlying tone of the reports reflect the Saudi and US companies’ fears of
the reduction of oil production and eventual depletion, oil on which the kingdom
relies heavily to support every aspect of its economy. Oil reserves are the main
indicator of an oil company’s worth, which “makes the task of estimating reserves far
more a matter of probability and than certainty.”463 This poses a serious problem for
the US due to its dependence on Saudi oil, and on which rests the Saudi-Western
alliance.
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When looking at the relationship between the US and powers in the Middle
East, the relationship is complex and becomes political rather than economic,
succumbing to petrodollar pressure. “Arab financial transactions have often been
accompanied by a political dimension tied to foreign policy interests.”464 According
to Steven Emerson, ta pro-Zionist, the power of the petrodollar influences the Arab
world’s contention with the Zionist movement’s efforts to establish a Jewish state in
the Middle East. He also ntoes that from the beginning of Saudi Arabia’s history as a
kingdom, King Saud cautioned against the establishment of a Jewish homeland. King
Saud’s strong opposition is seen in his interview in 1943 with Life magazine in
Riyadh, where he “retold the history of the region and gave his reasons for rejecting
all arguments used to validate the Jewish claim to a homeland in the region.”465
Regardless of validity of King Saud’s historical facts concerning the contention
between the two religions, it is important to note the king’s strong opposition to a
peace conflict and negotiation, which further complicates oil’s position in the
kingdom and in the world.

Conclusion
The Middle East’s thriving oil industry has brought a great amount of wealth
to many of its nations and positions them at the top of many industries. Nations
dependent on Middle Eastern oil then become deeply connected with the politics and
economics of the region. Subsequently, the social fabric of these thriving economies
is changed due to the modernization and development that oil brings. In certain eyes
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from Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Middle East, this is seen as the decline of the
world that needs to be brought back to the correct path as discussed in Chapter Three.
Conflict does not arise from differing cultural and religious reasons, but as a conflict
over the effect of modernization and development in the oil-producing Arab states.
Oil as natural resource lies at the heart of this internal debate, feeding the voracious
struggle between the state as it tries to maintain a hegemonic power and Islamic
fundamentalists that reject of a modern world in favor of a more Islamic society.
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Chapter 5:
Resource Wars: Water in Palestine

Introduction
This chapter discusses the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of a struggle
over water as a dwindling resource in the arid region of the Middle East. Water rights
in Palestine that influence the economic, social, and political play a crucial factor in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for a nation state. Conflict over water, not because of
religious differences, becomes one of the contested issues between the Israelis and
Palestinians. Hillel Shuval agrees and sees the disputes over water resources as
“becoming a major roadblock in the final stages of the path of peace.”466 The “oil
sword” of Saudi Arabia parallels with the Israeli power of water security due to its
heightened position in the region after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948
by the United Nations (and support from the US.)
According to Samuel W. Lewis in his article, “The United States and
Israel,”467 there are five elements that rest at the basis of the unofficial and unspoken
US-Israeli alliance. First, the US was absent during the murder of 6 million Jews
during holocaust of World War II. As a result, US foreign policy regarding the
creation of and the existence of Israel instilled a sense of humanitarian effort. US’
efforts in Israel resulted to help the European Jews displaced from Hitler’s regime.
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Second, donations from wealthy American Jews played a large role in the US
political scene, specifically with the Democratic Party. Third, the American sense of
idealism “contributed admiration for the founding of a new democratic state which
proclaimed a Declaration of Independence redolent with phrases drawn from that of
the United States.”468 Fourth, American Christians identified with the Jews due to the
“common Judeo-Christian Bible and heritage,”469 that supported the return of the
Holy Land. Fifth, widespread ignorance of the US public regarding the Arab people
and cultures intensified the support for Israel against the Palestinians.
The chapter will begin with a discussion of Israeli and Palestinian desire and
right for a national identity, followed by Palestine’s available water resources, each
group’s access to these resources, ending with a discussion of the US-Israeli
relationship that affects the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

National Identity
For the discussion of the rights to the Holy Land, Israeli Zionism and
Palestinian nationalism evolved as the justifications to modernization in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries.470 In their article, “Religion, State, and the International
System in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Hillel Frisch and Shmuel Sandler support
the notion that the conflict is not based on ideology with religious justification, but
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rather, is focused on the statist relations between Zionism and Palestinian
nationalism.471
Nationalist and statist relations result from the struggle over national identity.
National identity cannot be negotiated, and individuals will not easily give up their
core identities, such as their sense of peoplehood, attachment and historical
authenticity to the land, and commitment to national culture.472 Each identity
“[claims] the same territory, and each seeks ownership of that territory and control
over its resources as the basis of an independent state that gives political expression to
its national identity.”473 A national identity is also legitimzed by the mere existence of
another national identity that challenges their claim to ownership of the land and its
resources. The act of an identity’s negation of another shows the power of even
acknowledging the existence of a contrasting identity. The existence of each identity
becomes an existential threat to the meaning and collective purpose of the other. “All
issues tend to become existential-matters of life and death for each side.”474 An
exclusive and monolithic nature results as a defining characteristic of each identity
making conflict resolution difficult. As a result, a group’s identity is defined by
several dimensions, “such as ethnicity, religion, and language,”475 all of which are
highly correlated.
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When claiming the land, each identity also has its own historical narrative
regarding the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, with both sides negating the other
“to bolster the justice of their own cause.”476 From the Israeli point of view, the
establishment of the State was the rightful return of the Jews, a chosen people, to their
ancestral homeland, holding the “incompetent” Palestinian leaders responsibility for
the Palestinian refugee. The United Nations cited the establishment of a Jewish state
in Palestine as “’unassailable’: ‘it is the natural right of the Jewish people to lead, as
do all other nations, an independent existence in its sovereign state.’”477 From the
Palestinian point of view, Western European colonialism displaced the Palestinian
population for the immigrating Jewish population who were only a religious group
and not a nation entitled to its own state. The Zionist movement, established by the
First Zionist Conference in 1897 by Theodor Herzl, began the movement’s “vision of
national revival.”478
The justifications for Palestine according to the Israelis and Palestinians are
equally just and reasonable, yet ripe with problems. From the Israeli perspective, the
Zionist movement justifies the creation of the State of Israel, one that “[identifies] the
Jews as a political, not solely a religious group, and maintained that the Jews’
problem was a political one.”479 According to Alexander Flores, its principle goal is
building a Jewish state in Palestine, which is a political and secular problem.
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The Zionist movement remained secular and rejected religious discourse and
reasoning to ensure its international presence. Zionists only used Judaism to rally the
support of other European Jews in addition to separating themselves with a religious
divide from everyone else.480 In 1919, Chaim Weitzmann, the president of the World
Zionist Organization and the first president of the State of Israel481 wrote to the
British Prime Minister David Lloyd George regarding the requirements for a Jewish
State.482 Such requirements included territories in the valley of Litani and the western
slopes of the Hermon range, which are “imperatively demanded by the requirements
of modern economic life,”483 and represent a “return to the soil.”484
Weitzmann emphasized the territories’ importance to establish a on modern
Jewish, economic life that must be met in order to gain a Jewish state. To achieve this
goal, it was necessary to development of an agricultural sector, which, clearly would
require an adequate amount and source of water to support the agricultural industry.
Adequate and fair water rights are crucial for the Zionist movement’s goal for a
Jewish state in Palestine to protect the state’s existence.
However, similar to the Israeli concern is the Palestinian right to a state.
Palestinians use a form of Arab nationalism to justify the Palestinian claim to the land
“based on majoritiarian rule that [reflects] the culture and proclivities of the vast
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majority of its inhabitants.”485 Arab nationalism is driven by the urge for autonomy
that initially remains as a political tool to ensure rights and needs, but still focused on
receiving independence.486 Originating in Egypt, Arab nationalism was invoked by
nations in the Middle East as a uniting tool to claim rights over the Holy Land that
contended with the Zionist movement. According to the Encyclopedia of Islam and
the Muslim World, Arab nationalism shaped the political ideologies of postcolonial
nations in the Middle East through the rejection of Western influences to instill the
values of Muslim unity that would restore the region morally and politically.487
Initially used by Arab nations to reject the rule of the Ottoman Empire, Arab
nationalism evolved through World War I to eventually become an anti-imperial
opposition movement against British rule during the British Mandate period.
Seen during the rebellion of 1946-49, Arab states in the Middle East extended
their influence to the affairs in Palestine through their initial negotiations and then
military force against the newly declared State of Israel488that was established by
brute force by the British, both for inherently secular reasons.489 “The reaction of
Palestinians to the realization of the Zionist project in turn was nationalist and hence
secular.”490 Finally, in 1964 the establishment of PLO, the Palestinian Liberation
Organization, represents the Arab’s view of a unified Palestinian-centered territorial
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nationalism and gave a voice to Palestinian refugees in neighboring nations who were
silenced and/or displaced by the creation of Israel.
The Palestinian Arabs refer to the creation of the state of Israel in 1948 as alNakbah, or the ‘disaster’. The indigenous population was uprooted from their home
of 1,300 years, while 55 percent of Palestine was given to the Jews who had
previously owned less than ten percent of the land, representing only one third of the
population.491 As a result, between 1948 and 1950, 930,000 Palestinian Arabs became
refugees in addition to Israel’s doctrine of defense of the “iron curtain”492 to curtail
the number of refugees allowed to return. Other Arab states did little to aid the
Palestinian Arabs after 1950, seen Egypt’s rejection of nationality to Palestinians.
According to Asem Khalil, Egypt’s hesitates to grant Palestinians citizenship
is due to the unwanted blending of Egyptian and Palestinian cultures, languages and
ethnicities. If a Palestinian were to be given Egyptian citizenship, they would not
“necessarily coincide with the totality of the citizens of [the Egyptian] state.”493
Additionally, with the emergence of a large Palestinian population, this constituent
power could exercise sovereign power over a territory and create a Palestinian state.
“Once the Palestinian state is created, the relationship between the Palestinian
nationals and Palestinian citizens will need to be defined.”
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Sources of water in Palestine
The indeterminate boundary lines in Palestine of the Jordan River and the
Mountain Aquifer complicate the issue of water rights, and represent Palestine’s two
main water resources. Water sources are not confined to one authority or state, which
further complicates negotiations for the distribution of water.
The Jordan River creates severe problems because of its geopolitical status.
Before the Six Day War in 1967, proper borders were delineated by water sources
and used by all surrounding nations, such as Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan. Each
possessed rights over streams/tributaries that lead into the Jordan River, which
crosses the four state boundaries.494 Lebanon’s tributary, Hasbani, originates on the
Hermon mountain range with a flow of 157 million cubic meters per year (mcm/yr).
Syria’s tributary, the Banias, originates on the Golan side of the Hermon range with a
flow of 157 mcm/yr. Israel holds the Dan tributary with an annual flow of 258
mcm/yr, and originates deep within the Hermon mountain range. The largest
tributary, the Yarmouk, with a flow of 400-500 mcm/yr, flows through Syria then
along the Syrian-Jordanian border, then into Israeli territory before joining the Jordan
River. The river flows from 2,200 meters above sea level to 400 meters below sea
level, creating a natural flow of water downstream.
The system of the Mountain Aquifer is made up of natural springs and drilled
wells that extend to both sides of the central territory of the Judaean and Samarian
Mountain range in Israel, from the Jezreal Valley to the Beersheba Valley, and from
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the foothills of the Judean Mountains to the Jordan River.495 The aquifer is divided
into three general zones, the Western Aquifer Basin (Yarkon-Tanninim), the
Northeastern Aquifer Basin (Schem/Nablus-Gilboa), and the Eastern Aquifer Basin.
The Western aquifer has an average of 350-360 mcm/yr and resides in Israel.
Before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, the aquifer was used by Jewish
farmers, which evolved after statehood to become a major supplier of water through
the Yarkon-Negev Pipeline in 1954. Within the Israeli border, 300 wells are used to
tap the aquifer’s resources, yet some wells were dug by Israel for Israeli settlements
outside the Israeli border.496 The Northeastern aquifer is used within Israel and has
about 130 mcm/yr, 100 mcm/yr sourced to Israeli forces and 30 mcm/yr to
Palestinians. The Eastern aquifer is made up of two strata, the Upper Cenomanian and
the Lower Cenomanian, both under Palestinian control. The Upper Cenomanian is
made up of springs, yet is highly affected by inter-seasonal fluctuations, especially
during droughts seen in 1988-91. The Lower Cenomanian is a much better source of
water, being a deep fresh water aquifer. The two strata add up to the Eastern aquifer’s
total yield of 150-200 mcm/yr, which remains in Palestinian control.
Wells and springs of the Mountain Aquifer are used for additional water
resources. Yet this channeling of resources is not equal between the Israelis and
Palestinians due to the amount of production, regardless of the number of
mechanisms. With respect to wells, Palestinians are in control of 519 wells, while
Israelis hold 42 wells. Of the 519 Palestinian wells, only 353 are water producing
wells with a total yield of 72.3 mcm/yr, with only 70% meeting World Heath
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Organization (WHO) standards for drinking water. Of the 42 Israeli wells, 38 are
production wells with a total yield of 50 mcm/yr, while 94% of them meet WHO
standard for drinking water. From water allocation through springs, Palestinians are
in control of 146 springs with a total yield of 65.9 mcm/yr, while Israelis control 11
springs yet with a total yield of 88.3 mcm/yr.497 On the surface, it appears that Israel
and Palestine have equal rights to the water resources, when in fact each region’s total
yields are starkly different. These disparities in water allocation heighten the dispute
over water security and stabilization.
According to speculative information on Israel’s water usage, an average of
45-60 mcm/yr is diverted by Israeli forces for Israeli settlements in the West Bank
“diverted by Israeli wells”.498 According to Hillel Shuval, since 1967 Israel has
tapped even more sweet water sources through new deep wells that supply water to
Israeli settlements.499Error! Bookmark not defined. Israel’s development of deep wells has
reduced the Palestinian flow from traditional springs and wells.500 Currently, there is
a total of 630 mcm/yr of known potential yields of the Mountain Aquifer, while Israel
uses 410 mcm/yr and Palestine uses 110 mcm/yr, with the remaining 50-100 mcm/yr
left for Palestinian deep well drilling. Both Israel and Palestine allocate water from
other aquifers drilled after 1967, yet the major portion of the recharge area of the
aquifer lies in Israeli hands, with an estimate of 672 mcm/yr, giving them more
control over the water flow.
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The Jordan River and the Mountain Aquifer both provide a substantial amount
of water to Israeli and Palestinian regions, yet the rights to each water resource are
widely debatable. Regardless of who has the rights to Palestine, from the previous
conclusive evidence, Israel has the upper hand over water rights in Palestine. A
general summary of the argument between the Israelis and Palestinians in the 20th
century will be outlined in the following section that complicates the authority of
these two sources of water.

Israel’s use of water
The immigration of the Diaspora Jews to Palestine in the 19th and 20th century
was focused in urban locales, such as Jerusalem and Hebron. These locales became
the center of Jewish society in pre-Zionist Palestine, and were called the Old Yishuv.
After World War I, in 1929 Palestine allowed the Old Yishuv to organize an
autonomous body with a national assembly and executive council, the only Jewish
community allowed to do so. 501 The Old Yishuv became the heart of the region that
helped to influence the initial Zionist ideology of nation building through social and
territorial causes. Using the ideas of the pre-Zionist movement, the Old Yishuv made
the move from the urban core to the peripheral core due to the abundance of land and
the emerging allure of the developing societies. The now “New” Yishuv’s population
increased astronomically from 1929 to 1939, with the population beginning at
160,000 and jumping to 500,000.502 One fourth of this Jewish population lived in
cooperative farming communities in 1939, beginning the development of a Jewish
501
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society in the State of Israel. The New Yishuv’s goal was to establish a society of
agricultural workers and to demonstrate that the new generation of Jews was a strong,
confident, and Hebrew-speaking people. 502 To attract more of the European Jews to
these societies, Jewish settlers needed a minimal standard of living, housing
availability, and job opportunity for further incentives other than just to join the
Jewish state.
The access and availability of water became an important factor the
establishment of the State of Israel to assure the successful absorption of the Jewish
population. Nadav Morag concedes that a strong settlement is crucial for the Jewish
nation. “Without settlement, the Jews would have no hope of changing the
demographic balance in Palestine in their favour and hence laying the basis for a
claim to sovereignty over Palestine.’ 503 Irrigation answered the problem of how to
establish a vibrant Jewish society in the Jordan Valley. Stable and efficient water
availability would allow for a stable agricultural segment to provide job opportunities
and food resources bringing more people to the regions and increasing the land’s
population.
In order to fulfill the creation of a Jewish nation and ensure its sustainability,
two issues resonate within the nation to ensure nationhood existence: the ability to
provide security from external threats and to build a society through economic and
social policies. Agriculture directly affects both the economic stabilizing of a Jewish
state that help to remove Israel from a dependent relationship with neighboring
nations.
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Israel’s agricultural sector relies on Palestine’s water availability. Israel uses
over 95% of its available water, about 1,650 mcm, which does not provide enough
extra water supplies incase of a sudden change in availability. 1,650 mcm is about
one third of Israel’s total rainfall due to the 60% evaporation rate of its semi-arid
conditions. This portion of available water is partitioned through the state’s needs:
75-80% for agriculture, 15-18% for domestic use, and 4-7% for industrial use.
The stability of Israel’s agricultural sector is vital for of its right to statehood
and security sector. The development of Israel’s economy is supported by its
agricultural sector due to the state’s goal of self-sufficiency that is crucial to its
protection of food supplies from a possible partial Arab blockade. 503 In the 1950’s,
Israel was unable to produce enough food for its growing population, and had to
institute food rationing from 1949-1952. However, with the cultivation of land
through irrigation and the establishment of water channels, Israel’s food production
increased.504 Water availability inevitably determines the production rate, growth, and
prosperity of the agricultural sector vital to Israel’s livelihood.
To further help the state of Israel, a stable society must be built through the
development of agriculture and settlement. The ability to create a physical basis for
an independent state and to establish a society of agricultural workers are primary
factors for developing a land for the Jewish population. These two factors would
allow the settlement of larger Jewish populations in Palestine, as well as the extension
of the Jewish population into scattered areas of the country.
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The Palestinian state’s use of water
Similar to the Zionist movement that depends on water resources for the
development of a Jewish homeland, adequate water resources for the Palestinian
movement support a strong economy and population, which is vital for an
independent nation in the Middle East. The history of the Palestinian request for
autonomy begins with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 by the United
Nations who demoted the Palestinians to a second tier status. Therefore, Palestinian
justifications for water rights often focus on rights that balance out the power given to
Israel from the events of 1948 through 1974. “During this period, the source of power
became firmly embedded within Israel . . . the 1967 war increased the asymmetrical
nature of power relations in Israel’s favour, such that the latter was able to impose
unilateral solutions.”505
Palestine’s economy in the later 20th and early 21st century represents the
effects of an imbalanced power as a result of the influence of foreign powers, i.e. the
state of Israel established by the UN. Water rights are crucial in a peace agreement
because of agriculture’s place in the Palestinian economy. However, the Palestinian
agricultural industry is unable to move past its small-scale status due to the
requirement of Israel’s approval in most activity.506 Irrigation is a vital component to
the agricultural industry, mainly situated in Gaza, the Jordan Valley, and the northern
districts of the West Bank, over which Israel ultimately has control. As of 2002,
Palestine’s GDP was estimated at $1.8 billion in contrast to Israel’s around $18
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billion507, with a contribution of 28% by the industrial economy, 63% by services,
and 8% by agriculture.508 Any change in the water availability would not only affect
the agricultural sector that provides needed securities for the population, such as a
secure food source, but would also affect other industries that support the GDP that
are crucial for a thriving society. Important to note is the 2.8% contribution of Israel’s
agricultural economy to the total GDP, despite its use of 50% of total water supply for
irrigation purposes (Palestine uses 11% of total water supply for agricultural
industry). Agriculture also produces vital job opportunities that raised Palestinian
employment from 12.7% in 1995 to 16% in 2004.
To counteract the imbalance of power, international contributions have helped
the plight of the Palestinians, seen in the PLO’s efforts as well as the current
influence of the United Nations. With the establishment of PLO in 1964, Palestinian
rights were given international recognition through PLO’s position as the “sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.”509 Israel’s position within the
international community was undermined by the Palestinian cry with its part of the
international agenda.510 In 1974 with the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 3236, the UN identified the Palestinian right to return as an “inalienable
right,” which leads to the Palestinian justification for water rights as an international
necessity.
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Palestinian rights to water
The right of every human being to have water to sustain life is the
Palestinians’ first justification for secure access. The Palestinian question over water
uses several international human rights treaties that put peoples needs for water
first.511 International human rights groups, such as like the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural rights, defines the human right to water thus: “The
human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, physically
accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses.”512
The second right to water relates to international water law regarding
territorial disputes. According to Hillel I. Shuval, four out of the eight Palestinian
claims to water rights involve territorial disagreements.513 The claims focus on
Israel’s improper and unfair extraction of water from Palestinian territory that, if
extracted completely, could harm the Palestinian economy severely.514 To help
appease these water disagreements, the International Law Association in 1966
established the Helsinki Rules that were a peaceful approach that determined the
concept of “equitable apportionment,” meaning that, “Each basin state is entitled,
within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the
waters on an international drainage basin.”515 Although the Helsinki Rules only
applied to ground water usage, other policies were later made to include surface water
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that, for the purpose of this paper, would include the Jordan River in addition to the
Mountain Aquifer.516

Conflicts in Palestine
The first Palestinian intifadah took place in 1987 and recognized the PLO as
“the sole, legitimate representative of ‘our people, all our people wherever they
congregate in our homeland or outside it,’”517 giving PLO more recognition. To help
the Palestinian plight, slightly similar in its goals for an Arab Palestine, Hamas was
established a year earlier as an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood who did not
favor a US-PLO dialogue. “The fear was that the peace process would merely serve
to legitimize the ‘Zionist entity’- Hamas refused to call Israel by its name; in its view,
there could be a truce (hudnah) with it, but never a settlement.”518
The second Palestinian intifadah, or al-Aqsa intifadah, commenced in
September 2000 prompted by Ariel Sharon’s electioneering visit to the al-Aqsa
Mosque, affirmed by Imad Al-Faluhi, the Palestinian Authority’s Communications
Minister.519 Yassar Arafat was unhappy with the peace process of the Camp David
negotiations that year due to the relatively little importance given to the rights of
Palestinians. In 1993 with the Oslo Accords, Palestinians were awarded the West
Bank and Gaza, representing 22 percent of Palestine, and then in 2000 at the Camp
David negotiations, Palestinians were given 80 percent of the 22 percent of the 100
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percent of their original homeland.520 ‘Martrydom operations’ were instituted by
Hamas in March 2001 to “strike within Israel’s heartland” in order to protest the
Jewish nation. According to Ritchie Ovendale, from the Muslim perspective, jihad
was a viable response to the infidels in control of Muslim land furthered by the
‘martyrdom operations.’ The suicide bombing carried out by Palestinians in Israel
became the conflict’s distinctive characteristic and was a form of resistance against
the infidels included the strategies utilized for jihad.521
From the statistics above, it is clear that Israeli forces are in control of water
allocation in Palestine due to their dominant political presence and power in the
region because of foreign involvement. The following is the history of the US-Israeli
relationship that strengthens the state of Israel to hold an authority over water rights
in Palestine. The US has given economic and military aid to Israel over the latter half
of the 20th century first, to stop the expansion of communism (and thought to be allied
Arab nationalism) seen during the Cold War, and second, to establish a Western ally
in the Middle East.

The history of the US alliance with Israel
While referring back to Samuel W. Lewis’ five elements that rest at the basis
of the unofficial US-Israel alliance, a discussion of the region’s historical ties with the
US must be elaborated on.
The US-Israeli alliance began in February 1957 during the Eisenhower
administration. Until the Carter administration, much of the historical narrative
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concerning the Arab-Israeli conflicts revolves around US-Soviet global rivalry.522 The
US would only support the United Nations sanctions regarding the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict if Israel withdrew from Gaza and other Egyptian territory from the seizeure
in 1956 during the Suez Crisis. Israel agreed under the condition that Egypt would
allow Israeli vessels free passage through the Straits of Tiran in addition to an UNsupported force to protect the Israeli-Egyptian border. Israel’s economics and
military-strategic circumstances were allied with those of the US,523 which led to the
subsequent withdrawal of Israel that set a diplomatic tone524 as a “deepening US
commitment to Israeli security.”525
The US saw Israel’s strength during the Suez Crisis as a vital addition to the
US’ desire to contain radical Arab nationalism thought to be allied with communism.
Congress supported the US involvement in the Middle Eastern nations threatened to
fall under the influence of communism through military and economic aid, as seen
with the Eisenhower doctrine of 1957.526 In 1959, the US gave into Israel’s request of
financial and military support against Soviet aggression with $100 million in
technical and financial assistance, and in 1960 with $10 million worth of radar
equipment. Fearing the backlash from certain Arab nations against the US for their
generous contribution, Eisenhower rejected Israel’s last request of HAWK missiles to
maintain a neutral yet tilted status in the Middle East. The interests of protecting US
oil flow and maintaining political support from wealthy Jewish Americas lay at the
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base of the US’ stance on the Israeli-Palestinian problem seen in its partial support for
both sides. Broadly speaking, US involvement in the Middle East was to ensure the
protection of its interests from communist Soviet Union.
During the Eisenhower administration of the 1950’s, the President viewed the
Israelis as “potential allies in his struggle to contain Soviet-backed revolutionary
Arab nationalism.”527 During the Kennedy administration of the 1960’s, Israel began
to develop weapons, igniting the US to continue its pledged assistance in the event of
Arab aggression to protect Israel and the US interests. Egypt also received MIG’s
from the Soviet Union that worried Washington, causing debate over the amount of
security and protection that Israel should receive from US without compromising US
relations with Arab nations in the Middle East. Kennedy facilitated the situation in
1961 by using a comprehensive regional settlement to handle the disputes rather than
providing more military support to Israel to use against Egypt.
However, after the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, the US held a peace-seeker
status and tried to negotiate with Israel to withdraw from certain territories in order to
bring peace to the conflict. In exchange for the surrender of Israeli territory, the US
would support Israel to create a strong tie in the Middle East to ensure the protection
of US interests in the region. This Western alliance was discussed frequently, yet in
an informal and implicit way.528
The era of President Jimmy Carter represents a move away from support of
Israel for anti-Soviet reasons into one focused on bringing peace to the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. In the past administrations, the Palestinians were ignored, thus
527
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Carter incorporated them into American interests through the meeting at Camp David
in 1978 to make the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel. Yet Carter still kept in
mind US interests in Israel, sending more economic and military aid and cooperation
to Israel.
Israel’s position in US foreign policy changed with the Reagan administration,
which reverted to viewing the alliance with Israel through a Cold War lens. Israel was
a friendly and democratic ally with the US, amidst some hostile Arab nations allied
with the Soviet Union. However, the US could maintain a simultaneous relationship
with both the Arabs and the Israelis through the Reagan era’s “strategic cooperation.”
During the 1980’s the US maintained a “military-to-military” relationship with Israel,
while also strengthening ties with Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Yet with
the commencement of the Palestinian intifada in 1987, American public support for
Israel dwindled due to the image of the Israeli army as a “brutal occupier” supported
by with US financial and military aid.
The US outlook on the Arab-Israeli problem reverted to protecting Israeli and
US interests during the Bush I administration from 1989-1993. A peace negotiation
was not “only in Israel’s interest and that of the long-suffering Palestinians, but also
very much in the American interests.”529 The Madrid Peace Conference in late 1991
represents the culmination of the US’ newfound power and interests in forging peace
in the region, with the commencement of face-to-face meetings of Arab and Israeli
leaders. At the same time, the position of the Israeli prime minister was changing,
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from Minister Yitzhak Shamir to Yitzak Rabin, who held a much more supportive
stance on the relations between Israel and the US.
With the election of President Clinton in 1993, the US-Israel relationship
changed dramatically. President Clinton and Minister Rabin extensively discussed
plans and strategies for peace, establishing a deep diplomatic relationship that had not
been seen before. The US also fervently supported the Israeli-Palestinian agreement
signed in Oslo in 1993, leading to the large US donation of two billion dollars to the
West Bank and Gaza in order to help establish the new Palestinian authority
described in the Oslo Agreement.
Continuing through the Clinton, Bush and into President Obama’s
administration, peace to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ceases to be fully realized. In
April 2003, the Quartlet, made up of about 40 nations including the United States, the
European Union, and the United Nations, released a ‘Roadmap’ that “outlines a threestage program leading to an independent Palestinian state and a ‘final and
comprehensive settlement for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ by 2005.”530 The
roadmap was titled, “Performance-based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State
Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Crisis.” Their obligations under the Roadmap were
enacted on November 27, 2008 when leaders of the United States, Israel, and the
Palestinians agreed to establish a peace treaty by the end of 2008 through the creation
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of a Palestinian state.531 Yet to this day, a peace treaty has not been made between the
Israelis and Palestinians despite numerous efforts to institute a two-state solution.532

Conclusion
Water rights in Palestine hold a substantial position concerning the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. Religious and cultural differences are not the sole reason for
conflict, which are often the perceived visage. The creation of the state of Israel in
1948 augmented the power structure in Palestine, giving Israeli forces more power,
influence, and control over the region’s resources. As a result, a struggle continues to
exist between the Israelis and Palestinians for equal rights to a nation that can only be
accomplished through adequate natural sources to support the economic, social and
political growth of a nation. Noam Chomsky notes the US’ persistence to maintain an
influential role in the region, “and to a search for a ‘hidden agenda, for example to
help Israel control the Palestinians, to control Iraqi oilfields, or generally to extend
American hegemony.’”533
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Conclusion to Thesis

The purpose of my thesis was to counter Samuel Huntington’s argument that
the world’s conflict is over differing civilizations, religions, or cultures. Whether or
not religion is declining or growing, it cannot be used to portray the world in a
‘cosmic war,’ or a battle between ‘good and evil’. Natural resources, not religions,
rest at the basis for the Islamic fundamentalist and militant movement due to its
response to the Western structural pressures that are modernizing Muslim societies.
Oil and water become vital tools for exercising power and authority of one nation
over another, and are identified as the true culprits for a conflict that is often furtively
concealed.
Chapter One discusses the true nature of religion’s place in a society, whether
the amount of religiosity or a differing religion had a true effect on conflict. World
order was to be determined by the access and power to natural resources rather than
opposing civilizations or religions. Chapter Two developed the US’ structural
pressure in the Middle East as a result over the access to natural resources and the
challenge to maintain itself as a hegemonic force over resources in the modernizing
Middle East. Chapter Three presents a parallel discussion of concerns that delves into
the predominant Muslim thinkers and movements that have influenced the modernday Islamist Muslim response to globalization and modernization because of US
influence. Chapters Four and Five explain the resources of oil and water as tangible
forces that are used to exert certain influences a structural powers for a one-sided
agenda of total wealth, power, and knowledge.
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According to the article by Fareed Zakaria titled, “Learning to Live with
Radical Islam,” a different kind of strategy to combat radical Islam needs to be
adequately developed in order to deal with and understand the world’s conflicts. In
2009, President Obama emphasized his concern for foreign policy in the Middle East
seen in his inaugural address that “reached out to the Muslim world calling for a
relationship based on mutual respect.”534 According to President Obama, a
“differentiated approach”535 towards Muslim nations needs to be made before a
substantial and enduring change can be considered. Even words or phrases that sound
similar to Samuel Huntington’s sweeping generalizations, like “ ‘war on terror,’
‘global insurgency,’ even ‘the Muslim world,’”536 must be avoided to ensure a
change. The quest for oil and water are portrayed as a clash of differing civilizations
and religions rather than the true nature of a clash of interests. With an accurate
consideration for the motives behind radical Islam and Islamic fundamentalism, the
true nature of the conflict can be attempted to be resolved.
The most powerful tool that the Islamic fundamentalism movement holds is
its position as a phenomenon. The obscure and theoretical view of Islamic
fundamentalism makes generalized connections to individuals and movements that
largely have little connections to each other, such as the created correlations of
Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in Afghanistan537 or between bin Laden and
Saddam Hussein. The distortion of radical Islam has become so great that Muslim and
“Western” imaginations have been altered far from the truth of reality, creating the
534
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theory of “Bin Ladenism.”538 Much like the highly skeptical “clash of civilizations,”
the “West” has been placed in “armed opposition” to Muslim fundamentalists that
further perpetuates the view of the struggle from Muslim and “Western”
viewpoints.539 As stated by Roxanne L. Euben, a scientific study of Islamic
fundamentalism needs to occur to distinguish the correlations among urbanization,
expanding education, commercialization, industrialization, and alienation that
“‘produce’ Islamic revival.”540
Equally alarming is the assumption similar to Huntington’s regarding the
support of radical Islam in the Middle East. According to the article by Fareed
Zakaria titled, “Learning to Live with Radical Islam,” a clear distinction needs to be
made and understood regarding the involvement of local militants and global
jihadists. Out of all the people “we” call a member of the Taliban, “less than 10
percent are ideologically aligned with Quetta Shura or Al Qaeda,” while 90 percent
are tribal fighters or Pashtun nationalists.541 Islamicists and jihadists have become the
two common “interchangeable”542 buzzwords, and need to be properly clarified to
understand their divergent goals. Islamicists ask for the plausible goal of their own
nation while jihadists demand an inconceivable and infeasible goal of destroying all
‘evil’ forms of power. Jihadists and radical Islam do not provide the answers to
modern-day problems, the exact antithesis to what radical Islam dictates as its
purpose in the world. “They do not have a world view that can satisfy the aspirations
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of modern men and women. We do. That’s the most powerful weapon of all,”543 notes
Resa Aslan, Iranian-American Muslim author of No god but God and Cosmic War.
Oil and water stand as two of the most important resources that a nation or
civilization depends on in the modern world. Both resources nourish the modern
world in ways that are inextricably linked together to ensure the stabilization and
growth of a civilization. Oil’s versatile use in the world allows it to play a role in
almost every aspect of a modern society, ranging from the agricultural, industrial,
energy, social and political sectors. On the other hand, water is the fundamental
component to life that ensures the growth and development at the biological level of
every single human being and living creature on earth. The two resources are
influential and attentive to every single aspect of humanity’s progression thus are able
to shape the changing society and world. The power over change rests at the basis for
conflict’s motives, arising over the undeniable power over resources and therefore
ability to transform the world.
The rise of the Islamic fundamentalist movement cannot be looked at from
the critical point of view, seeing the Middle East as entity composed of violence,
hatred, and unjust. From the Western, academic point of view, the Islamic
fundamentalist viewpoint must be looked at in its own terms in order to understand its
evolving state of mind. As President Barack Obama stated in a speech given before
the Turkish parliament on April 6, 2009, “America’s relationship with the Muslim
community, the Muslim world, cannot and will not just be based upon opposition to
terrorism. We seek broader engagement based upon mutual interests and mutual
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respect.”544 Its complaints about modern civilization are valid due to the speed at
which the world appears to diminishing. While many of the movements’ actions and
ideologies are violent and unjustifiable, attention must be given to the origin of
concern derived from the modernization and globalization of the world. Speaking
broader than losing the Islamic culture in the Middle East, local and indigenous
traditions are being neglected for more globalized and homogenous tradition.
Hopefully in the years to come, the world’s leaders will hear and respond to the cries
of the Muslim world that are attempting to open our eyes to the damaged world in
need of great change. President Barack Obama has begun this transformation with his
concern and attention towards relations with the Middle East, overcoming the
stigmatized image of the conflict in the region over differing civilizations and culture.
President Obama is quoted as, “The United States ‘is not and will never be at war
with Islam.’”545
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